

Gender-responsive Peace and State-building Transforming the Culture of Power in Fragile States



A Cordaid and WO=MEN Policy Brief
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Glossary

DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EXCs	Ex- combatants
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility, subsidiary body of OECD-DAC
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAP 1325	National Action Plan for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSD	Security Sector Development, Programme for security sector development in Burundi, supported by the Dutch
WAFF	Women associated with armed forces

Gender Responsive Peace and State-Building¹

Transforming the Culture of Power in Fragile States

A CORDAID AND WO=MEN POLICY BRIEF

Introduction

10 years after the endorsement of SCR 1325, everybody talks about the importance of women's participation and leadership in conflict-affected countries: in peace talks, DDR, and SSR. The norm-building of SCR 1325 can as such be called a success. Yet a single focus on increasing the number of women participating or even leading in decision-making processes is not enough. It leaves untouched the social-cultural ideals that inform those decision-making processes: cultures of violence and patriarchal political systems that reproduce or even strengthen existing gender power inequalities. These social-cultural gender ideals are not solely supported by men and undemocratic leaders. They are reproduced by the society as a whole: by men *and* women, by power-holders *and* subordinates.

As long as gender ideals that reinforce power inequalities are left untouched, it remains very difficult for women to take up positions of power in the first place, as they will meet with fierce or even violent resistance in their families, communities and wider society. Secondly, women who manage to get into positions of power are likely to copy the dominant management styles and reproduce gender stereotypes in order to have influence over the system. As Srilatha Batliwala, Indian feminist activist and researcher, pointed outⁱ:

Since women have been denied power in the public domain for millennia, their only experience in the exercise of power is, by and large, in the familial or private sphere. Even in the private domain, however, most women have had to exercise power indirectly, through their influence on the key men of the household. Thus women have been conditioned to uphold male power, and to seek power through their influence on men. Conversely, women's only model for the exercise of power in the public sphere is that created by the patriarchal dominant class and caste. *The culture of power* which they have witnessed has been that of power over, not power on behalf of or for a larger social good.

The number of women in decision-making and leadership positions needs to be increased: we need to work on gender equality because it is a fundamental right and a necessary condition for the achievement of the objectives of elimination of poverty, growth, employment, social cohesion and the promotion of peace and securityⁱⁱ. But this will only be effective if we simultaneously change the culture of power into one that supports gender equality and sustainable peace building. **Gender-responsive peace and state-building aims to contribute to change that culture of power, by creating (1) gender responsive decision-making structures in politics and society, and by creating**

Gender is understood as a culturally specific discursive practice in which ideals of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' are produced and reproduced to prescribe what 'good men' and 'good women' should ideally *be* like (identity), act like (behavior and roles), and think like (norms and beliefs) in relation to each other. Or, as Baaz and Stern (2010: 13 footnote 21) write: 'Gender in this sense must be seen as a relationship of power, whereby the 'masculine' cannot be understood as separate from, and indeed is defined in opposition to, the 'feminine'.

The OECD-DAC defines *peace building* as 'encompassing measures in the context of emerging, current or post-conflict situations for the explicit purpose of preventing violent conflict and promoting lasting sustainable peace', and *state building* as, 'purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups', and recognizes that peace building is often an important part of the state-building dynamic, and vice versa.

(2) a sustainable national infrastructure for peace that allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with their own skills, institutions and resourcesⁱⁱⁱ.

Donors, notably the Netherlands, have been and are key partners in the implementation of peace processes: in the financing and advising on DDR processes (Great Lakes), SSR (Burundi and Afghanistan), and peace missions (AMIS, ISAF). Dutch policy-makers take decisions on funding of large (multilateral) programs, on diplomatic engagement with governments of conflict-affected areas and inter-governmental organizations like OECD-DAC, and on the details of Dutch contributions to peace-keeping missions. Efforts have been made to put gender on the agendas of all these peace building initiatives. Yet, it remains difficult for donors and diplomats to find concrete policy options to influence a process that is principally domestic, involves multiple players and interests, and (ultimately) requires a change of deeply rooted socio-cultural beliefs about the role of men and women in society.

Various researches have been conducted over the last years to compile lessons learnt on donor engagement that aims to increase women's participation in conflict-affected countries. Cordaid has supported four of such researches this year: on the costing and financing of the implementation of SCR 1325; on the operationalisation of SCR 1325 in peace processes; on the inclusion of women in the current peace talks in Afghanistan, and; on the involvement of women in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo^{iv}. WO-MEN has facilitated some policy analysis on the Dutch NAP 1325 and other relevant policies related to women, peace and security issues. This policy brief will draw on these researches to identify constraints and examples of success in gender responsive peace and state-building. It will first identify the four key elements of a mind-set needed to achieve this goal. It will then look at lessons learnt in concrete cases of (1) peace negotiations; (2) DDR; (3) SSR; and (4) peace keeping - specifically those that included Dutch involvement. Thirdly, it will look at two important mechanisms to stimulate gender-responsive state and peace-building, namely through funding (5), and the National Action Plan 1325 Working Group (6). It will finally list and compile concrete policy options for Dutch policy-makers, Dutch MPs, and Dutch NGOs, to help maximizing gender responsive leadership and decision-making in peace and state building efforts.

Though this policy brief focuses on policy recommendations for Dutch governmental and non-governmental actors, it also contains relevant insights for other EU actors involved in the implementation of 1325.

1. Rationale: Four Ingredients for a Gender-Responsive Mind-Set

Breaking Through Some Gender Stereotypes in Donor's Offices

The "Gender = Women" Stereotype^v

There exists a strong tendency amongst policy makers and politicians to equal 'gender' with 'women'. When studying three policy documents^{vi} on the Dutch engagement in fragile states and the furthering of human rights, for example, it appeared that 'gender' was mostly translated into a single focus on women's needs and women's empowerment, without this being clearly rooted in a gender analysis or strategy that addresses power relations between men and women. Besides, when women are mentioned, it is mostly as an add on, such as in 'especially women', or 'also for women'. Consequently, most budgets and programs supported under the header of 'gender', focus on targeting women only and use the number of female beneficiaries as main criteria for eligibility. What is more, they focus on sectors (stereo)typically associated with women, such as health, maternal mortality, education and sexual violence (the latter which seems to ignore male victims of sexual violence^{vii}) leaving untargeted the more 'masculine' sectors of economic development, infrastructure, government and security^{viii}. Amongst Dutch NGOs, the single focus on women seems to be informed by a gender bias that regards all women as automatically gender sensitive, and men as the opposite. Though most members of the NAP 1325 working group coordinated by the Dutch MFA are well aware about the need to involve the whole of society and try to address this, the latest draft strategy for the intensified partnership amongst Dutch NAP signatories still shows a tendency to exclusively focus on women.

The 'Gender = a luxury' Stereotype

When equaling 'gender' with 'women', policy makers unconsciously bring their own stereotyped images of 'femininity' to conclude that 'gender is soft', that 'gender is not strategic' or that 'gender is a luxury'. As Schoofs and Smits (2010) write in a recent Policy Brief from the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit^{ix}:

'(...), the dominant tendency among international donors is to define a limited set of strategic priorities for their engagement in fragile contexts, such as the establishment of minimum conditions for security and delivery of basic services. On this list of priorities, 'gender' is generally seen as a luxury to be left aside until the supposedly gender-neutral objectives in the domains of security and governance have been achieved.'

Gender is not soft or of second importance to establishing security: gender is at the core of creating sustainable peace and security. In many fragile states, particular gender ideals of power reinforce and sustain a culture of violence in which client-patron relations, corruption, money politics, and suppression of women and minorities can flourish. A culture of 'power over' that celebrates wealth and influence for self, community, and party, the dispensing of patronage, and the promotion of narrow interests, instead of a culture of 'power on behalf of' or for a larger social good. When disarming and reintegrating former combatants, when reforming the security sector, it is of prime importance to transform the culture of power. To build the skills and institutions in the newly established communities and security sectors that prevent a relapse into violence, including the (violent) suppression of women. This requires a major reform of the ideology, structure and organization of the formal and informal security and conflict-resolution systems.

‘Strategic acupuncture’^x in fragile states

Grand economic schemes and private sector investment

The most evident cause of war is war itself, Paul Collier wrote in his now famous World Bank Report “Breaking the Conflict Trap”. To successfully turn the tides of conflict, economic incentives are needed that change war economies into peace economies, that make investing in peaceful economic activities, income generation and (economic) power negotiations more attractive and rewarding to the leaders of rebel groups and state leaders, than investment in war economies and negotiation through violence. In fragile states most international and domestic delivery systems are designed for quick relief activities to decrease the impact of recurring humanitarian crises. There is a need to change an approach oriented at short-term economic recovery, small seed money and micro-credit projects to one oriented at big scheme economic projects and economic growth. There is a need for economic development plans that challenge unequal gender relations instead of small income generating programs that often sustain the subordinate economic position of women, as they do not offer real prospects for growth or large capital.

The intention of the new Dutch government to focus more on economic growth as a way to lift countries out of poverty and conflict is promising in this context. In many fragile states, most private sectors are in the hands of foreign businessmen from neighbouring countries who go for quick cash, and do not invest economic revenues to develop the country or take care of social and environmental sustainability. International governments can help to create an environment that attracts companies to invest in women’s economic empowerment by offering subsidies as incentives, and promoting/spreading the knowledge that efforts and investments to economically empower women leads to better company performance because it links them to, large, often very large, markets, a talent source and a global talent advantage, and enhanced reputation and brand, and – according to a third of the international companies surveyed by McKinsey^{xi} – leads to increased profits. They can establish measures and oversight of multinational corporations who massively avoid tax payment in developing countries (to a total of 160 million dollar a year).

Strengthening state-society links

If international donors focus too exclusively on state building, they run the risk of constructing parallel systems that have no link to local informal systems of service delivery and conflict resolution – systems that proved to be successful coping mechanisms for the women and men dealing with community leaders, community councils, elders, NGOs, local government, households, village leaders etcetera.

Most policies on state-building in fragile states subscribe to the importance of building state-society links as a way to strengthen the legitimacy of governmental authorities, and to ensure service delivery in areas where governmental structures are weak. Yet initiatives that build structural engagement between national or district government and civil society remain few. This is partly due to a lack of trust between governments and CS, particularly in fragile states where relations are often hostile and at times involve prosecution and violent encounters. Western donors on the other hand often mention an observed lack of professionalism and coordination amongst CS organizations, weak organizational structures, and a tendency to complain and protest, instead of bringing constructive proposals. Consequently, many (senior) diplomats regard CS engagement in donor-partner country cooperation as invitations to trouble^{xii}. Besides, budgets for state- a and peacebuilding in fragile states tend to either focus on the strengthening of the national government, or on the strengthening

of civil society, but seldom explicitly focus on funding programs or initiatives that strengthen structural engagement between both parties.

On the other hand, some promising examples of state-society cooperation exist in the Dutch 1325 National Action Plan (NAP) working group, comprised of representatives of government and civil society. And in the international dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding by the OECD-DAC that was held in Dili April 2010, and in which representatives from donor countries, fragile states and international civil society equally participated. To help developing these (ad hoc) initiatives into more consistent and structural state-society cooperation, both the problem of mutual distrust and separate funding channels need to be addressed.

2. Lessons Learnt in Peace Talks, DDR, SSR and Peacekeeping

2.1 Gender-responsive peace negotiations

When women are actively involved, peace agreements are more credible and cover a broader range of issues. Their participation widens negotiations beyond issues of military action, power, and wealth sharing, and promotes a non-competitive negotiating style and bridge-building between the negotiating parties.

Yoka Brandt, Director-General International Cooperation at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs^{xiii}.

Uganda^{xiv}

Personal contacts matter when it comes to assisting such highly sensitive processes as peace negotiations. The Dutch involvement in the peace negotiations with the LRA in North-Uganda partly came about as a coincidence. When Yoka Brandt, the current Director-General International Cooperation at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, returned to Uganda in 2004 to serve as the Dutch Ambassador, she soon contacted Betty Bigombe whom she knew well from her earlier service in Uganda in the late 1980s. Miss Bigombe, who had then been the Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda, but now worked as a Worldbank consultant, considered reviving the peace talks that had come to an end in 1994. She had received word that the LRA was willing to reopen negotiations, and the two women – Yoka Brandt and Betty Bigombe - discussed this possibility over lunch. The Dutch Ambassador readily offered her assistance, and it was only a couple of months later that Betty managed to organize the first encounter between representatives from the LRA, the Museveni government, traditional and religious leaders from North-Uganda, and the 3 international observers from Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. Though the Dutch Ambassador could not be present at that first encounter in the North-Ugandes bush – as that would have been far too risky diplomatically and security-wise - she did attend at least 5 or 6 talks with President Museveni as international onbserver. Betty Bigombe had specifically asked the Dutch, as well as the other international observers, to help her obtain Museveni’s commitment to the peace process. The meetings were held in a very small setting, because the process needed an atmosphere of confidentiality and trust building. It was in this small setting that the Dutch, together with the Norwegians and the UK, succeeded to get Museveni’s commitment. Not by putting pressure on him by threatening to withdraw aid money or referring to the upcoming elections. But instead, by appealing to his own interests. Such as the chance to be recorded as grand statesman and peace broker in Ugandese history, and to be seen as a president who cares about the humanitarian needs of the 1.7 million IDPs. They also referred to the gains Museveni and his government could make when developing the North once it was free from conflict. And to the chances to open up regional

economic development once the peace negotiations in South Sudan and the bordering North Uganda would simultaneously succeed.

Having a woman as chief mediator was definitely helpful, according to Yoka Brandt, ‘especially when dealing with a clash of such big ego’s [as Kony and Museveni]’. In such a context, it is very important for the chief mediator to subject her or his own interests – such as for example gaining a high profile - to the greater good. Although this quality is certainly not something all women are naturally endowed with and men not, or vice versa, it is, according to Yoka, a quality that is more often observed in women than in men. Besides, men tend to feel less threatened by a woman, which can also be a “pro” when having to mediate between men.

That not all women have these qualities became clear when the LRA appointed a woman on their negotiation team in 2006. Once negotiations were taken to Juba in 2006, they got a much stronger international profile. The LRA woman negotiator had probably been appointed in response to international pressure, but she lacked any sense of the needs of her constituents and was in the game for her own gains only. Simultaneously, international agencies who were eager to play a role in the peace process, started seconding whole series of advisors, including gender advisors. Though it is important to have gender advisors in a negotiation team, it is crucial that those advisors are very well rooted in the local context and have a thorough understanding of the history of the conflict, so that they can give measured and specific advice. A UN advisor from New York is unlikely to have such knowledge. Thorough knowledge of the situation of female combatants and close contacts are other ingredients that make a woman negotiator – or gender advisor – effective. Betty Bigombe had all those qualities, but dropped out of the picture once the process was taken over by Sudanese Vice-president Riek Machar.

Bringing the peace talks to the international level, complicated the process in other ways too. It was a clear example of what Alex de Waal calls ‘the dollarization’ of the political marketplace, as international engagement tends to skew the price of peace deals^{xv}. In the much more locally driven peace talks of Betty Bigombe, there was of course a need for funding too. They talked about demobilization and reintegration of LRA combatants, and Kony wanted security and a new start. ‘But he did not think about becoming the vice-president or something’, Yoka Brandt recalls. And the sums of money demanded by Kony then were still reasonable. As soon as the internationals came in, however, advisers told Kony to ask for much larger sums of money. And suddenly representatives from Ugandese diaspora turned up and started to add their demands to the lists.

The ICC indictments against the LRA commanders in 2005 were another major obstacle to the peace talks of course. They indirectly led to the break-down of the “Bigombe talks”, and put the Dutch in a very difficult position. Of course, they had to support the ICC, but they also knew it would highly complicate the peace process. The fact that the ICC is based in The Hague, and continues to work on cases related to ongoing conflicts, impacts on the ability of the Dutch to assist in current and upcoming peace negotiations. But that the Dutch *can* have an influence, especially in locally driven peace talks and settings in which they have a long history and strong networks, is proven by the Uganda case.

Although the peace talks in Afghanistan do not qualify for a big role of the Dutch in that sense, the Dutch may still be able to contribute by offering some gender expertise, as long as this is in the person of an Afghan woman who has thorough knowledge of the history of the conflict, strong links with communities, and can count on receiving the esteem of Afghan power brokers. In Kenya, where the Dutch have a strong, long-term presence and no specific national interests - which helps to increase their credibility as independent party - the Dutch may be able to play a more significant role.

Forcing the negotiators

The NGO Gender Justice has been able to build coalitions of women's organizations that were eventually let in at the negotiation tables in the Ugandan peace processes. Liberian women 'took hostage' of negotiators by surrounding their building when negotiations had broken down. They refused to let them go until a ceasefire was agreed upon.

Afghanistan^{xvi}

The status of women in Afghanistan has been an extremely politicized and symbolic issue that has been manipulated by all parties to the conflict since the invasion of the country in 2001. While the Bush Administration used the claim of 'liberating' Afghan women to justify the war, the Taliban has in turn rallied support for its cause by equating women's progress to the corruption of Islamic values. Because of the symbolic and cultural value of women in Islamic society, differing views on the role of Afghan women have become a battleground over which competing visions for Afghan society and claims to power have been fought.

The biggest risk is that internationals are trying to get it over with

As the US/NATO coalition pursues a political and military solution to the war in Afghanistan, women fear paying the price of peace if their recent gains in terms of women's rights are bargained away by the central government. Some women interviewed for the Cordaid and WO=MEN study rejected negotiations outright and called for prolonged presence of foreign troops in the country, fearful of losing gains underpinned by international support. Other women supported a peace process on the basis that the insurgency is exacerbating the insecurity and violence against women. Yet they did so with clearly caveats – notably that the insurgents respect the Constitution and women's rights.

'Women need to be in the big tent with the boys'. The first Afghan Peace Jirga was held early June 2010, and it was due to the efforts of Afghan women organizations, notably the Afghan Women Network (AWN), and an intervention of US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, that the number of women was increased to about 20%. Still, none of them was involved in the planning of the event. International diplomats apparently continue to be hesitant about inviting women. Afghan women activists seeking to be part of the London Conference in January not only encountered resistance from Afghan officials who insisted that security talks were not "ladies business"^{xvii} – but European officials who questioned what value the women could bring to the discussions.^{xviii} The issue of women apparently continues to be viewed as a 'soft' and symbolic issue that is incongruous with security and military concerns.

Transitional justice: truth-telling, restorative justice and vetting as best alternatives

To date, the international community has been reluctant to address the issue of transitional justice, out of fears of destabilizing the government, which is made up of ex-Mujahideen warlords that helped coalition forces oust the Taliban. While some European governments are sympathetic to transitional justice, the US and UK are not. Many Afghans say that it would be impossible to prosecute the crimes of the Taliban while leaving the ex-Mujahideen commanders untouched. Professor Akram, the manager of the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Commission that has led the reintegration program to date, said any such prosecutions would open the "door" to another war. Yet women interviewees say any peace process will not be permanent if transitional justice is not addressed. One said that instability and ethnic conflict in the country has been fueled by granting both impunity and government positions to warlords. In 2005, the Afghan Government passed the 'Action Plan for Transitional Justice', which was drafted and driven by international donors. The

ambitious document set out a plan for the compensation of victims, civilian trials and prosecutions. There has been limited progress on it and its deadlines expired last year. One mechanism that has been established is a 'Special Advisory Panel for Senior Political Appointments,' designed to vet senior appointments across the government, police force, judiciary and provincial governments. It has been largely ineffective, vetting only a number of lower level appointments.

While analysts say the prospect of high-level symbolic prosecutions would be ideal, the prospect is dim, given a lack of capacity and impartial judiciary. More realistic is truth telling, compensation and the acknowledgement of victim's suffering.

2.2 Gender-responsive DDR

The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes Region

The recently closed Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) was by far the largest D&R program in the world in terms of number of states involved, individuals demobilized and levels of funding. It succeeded in mobilizing USD 450 million and structuring a complex partnership around the common objective of stabilizing the greater Great Lakes Region through demobilizing and reintegrating over 300,000 ex-combatants in seven countries (Evaluation: executive summary)^{xix}. Though a range of countries was on the recipients list^{xx}, most of the funding, notably 55% was used to finance activities in the DRC. The Netherlands contributed USD 125,831,219 to the MDRP, which was half of the total donor contribution (USD 253,036,256) for this seven year program that ran from April 2002 through June 2009.

Amongst the many lessons learnt of this ambitious and complex program, there are three issues that are worth highlighting in the context of this policy brief: lessons learnt related to the integration and implementation of a gender perspective; those related to the reintegration of former female and male combatants, and; those related to the management- and infrastructure for program oversight and implementation.

Labeling gender a 'special' project risks it being side-lined

Gender was supposed to be a focus area of the MDRP and gender based studies were conducted early on in the program period. According to the evaluation, these valuable studies were however not translated into practical approaches at the start of the program. When this weakness was noticed, the MDRP partners organized a special workshop on the gender dimension of the MDRP in November 2005, and requested the development of conceptual framework on gender and DDR in 2006. This led to the establishment of the Learning for Equality, Access and Peace (LEAP) Program that was launched with Danish funding in August 2007. 'The LEAP program included TA to national programs and projects; pilots to explore innovative ways to strengthening D&R and gender approaches, and studies and knowledge dissemination on Gender and D&R. Donors also contributed directly to the gender discussion, such as where the Netherlands commissioned a study on child-mothers in Northern Uganda (2006)'(Evaluation page 34).

Though these were all valuable steps, they came rather late in the program period, when the orientation was already towards planning a good exit strategy, and the space (and will) to integrate new program lines was limited. What may have contributed to this rather late implementation was that although gender had been defined as focus area, it was not mainstreamed in the programs key objectives and key principles. Gender was instead addressed under the header 'special group', which may have enhanced it being regarded as 'an extra' or 'a luxury'.

Consequently, the actual output in terms of D&R services provided to female ex-combatants remained unsatisfactory, according to the evaluators (page 35). The program struggled with an underreporting of female ex-combatants. Many female EXCs did not want to come forward for fear of being stigmatized, and the programs did not create favorable conditions to help them overcome that fear. Moreover, women associated with fighting forces (WAFF) did in most projects not qualify for benefits.

Lack of economic viability of reintegration activities

The underreporting of female combatants may also have been due to a lack of viable alternatives for income generation for EXCs – both male and female. According to the evaluators [page 41]: '[where] national efforts fell short was with the longer-term reintegration efforts (...). Few programs carried out studies to assess the economic viability of the activities that EXCs were being trained for or for which they were provided start-up kits. The major problem was stagnant national economies that did not provide many opportunities for developing sustainable livelihoods. But for a program that focused on preventing previously armed persons from returning to violence as a means of survival, this was a serious concern'.

The importance of a well-embedded implementing agency

Finally, the World Bank, who had been appointed to implement the MDRP, did not seem to have the optimal management and (knowledge) infrastructure to implement a program which success depends on close cooperation with local communities and power brokers, thorough knowledge of the social-economic and security context, and the ability and flexibility to adapt to a continually changing environment. According to the evaluation, the World Bank did not have rigorous systems in place to manage the trust funds [page 16]. With the secretariat based in Washington and most of the Advisory Committee Meetings taking place in Europe, the World Bank was not well embedded locally. Cooperation with the UN agencies - who did have a local infrastructure and experience with for community based DDR and gender mainstreaming - was tense due to a lack of clarity about the respective roles of both institutes, and different views on a range of DDR issues. As a consequence, the UN knowledge and infrastructure was not optimally used, and the MDRP ended up taking a more technical rather than social-political approach.

DRC Field Study 'Gender in DDR'

While the MDRP evaluation focused on the roles of international agencies in the planning and implementation of DDR in DRC, the research commissioned by Cordaid and Justitia et Pax – Netherlands^{xxi}, especially covers the views and experiences of women and men working at field level^{xxii}. In this report, two findings stand out.

Women who regard women as 'stupid' and 'subordinate'

A most interesting part of the research is the cultural analysis of Congolese beliefs and values that underpin the general view of women as being weak and subordinate to men. In Congolese society, women are generally regarded as 'stupid' and 'backward' by both women and men, both older and younger generations. This image is reinforced by many popular sayings and radio songs. Thus Céline Nzolire, coordinator of the Feminist Association for Social and Cultural Improvement in Butembo, told the researchers:

In 2007, we conducted a survey amongst 2000 students – all eligible voters in the 2006 elections – on their perception of women and men. We found that 99% of the weak characteristics listed were attributed to women, and only 1% to men. Before distributing the survey, we discussed a popular song that is often broadcasted on the radio and goes, "Hakili ya bibi haiwezi kupita ya bwana, hakili ya bibi iko sawa ya mutoto kidogo", meaning "The intelligence of a woman is nothing compared to that of a man: the intelligence of a woman is that of a small child". We were shocked when we found that the

majority of female and male students – all grown-ups of the 5th and 6th classes of secondary education - approved of this song.

Both women and men in the DRC hold on to a gender ideal that regards women as weak and stupid, and men as strong and natural leaders. Verses from the Bible are often used to support these views, and a large majority of the Congolese women feels strongly about observing these biblical prescriptions. The insight that women just as much support the subordinate place of Congolese women as men do, is furthermore illustrated by the following quote of a staff member of the NGO AFILMA^{xxiii}:

“...when joining AFILMA, I thought I’d have the support of the women, but unfortunately, it were the women who accused me and the men who congratulated and supported me”.

The conclusion that a change of gender ideals is needed to convince Congolese women and men that women can be good leaders too, is easily drawn from here. But it are not only the views and norms of Congolese society that form a hindrance to the participation of women in the planning and implementation of DDR: international donors did not seem to be strong drivers of change either, according to an informant. At the launch of the National Programme for DDR for ex-combatants (PN-DDR), 5 out of the 11 provincial coordination positions were filled by women. But, according to the researchers, this was only due to the fact that the national coordinator was a woman who cared, namely Innocente Bakanseka, who told the researchers:

“I had the power to decide about the recruitment. But I have to admit that the donors have not been very demanding concerning the issue of women’s participation in the management of DDR.”

Viable economic reintegration programs (yes: again)

A second finding standing out, is the clear need for viable economic reintegration programs that can convince combatants of lower rank – male and female – to hand in their arms and give up their positions. When the researchers asked a group of demobilized male and female combatants from Burinyi if they did not think it would be better to register at the disarmament and reintegration program, they said they preferred to stay in this position, as that would leave open the possibility to return to the army or use their weapons. Because they were not sure about the reinsertion that would allow them to start a new life. Hence an informant^{xxiv} of the Cordaid research raises the following appeal to international donors:

“Stop financing small projects for female EXCs and victims of sexual violence! Instead start financing grand (social-economic) infrastructure and development programs in which female EXCs can be inserted as part of larger global development schemes for the whole of society. So that EXCs play a role alongside others”.

2.3 Gender-Responsive SSR

The Security Sector Development (SSD) Programme in Burundi

Burundi is the Dutch example project on SSR. On April 10, 2009, the Dutch government signed an *Memorandum of Understanding* (MoU) with the Government of Burundi for a multi-year cooperation programme on security sector development in Burundi – referred to as the *Security Sector Development* (SSD) Programme. On the short term, the SSD Programme aims to relieve the Burundese army and police of some urgent operational needs through amongst others training, strategic advice, and the provision of infrastructure and material. Besides, the SSD Programme

contributes to the strengthening of democratic oversight of the Burundese security forces and the inclusion of civil society herein. The long term objective concerns improvement of the security of Burundese civilians through strengthening the legitimacy, effectiveness and quality of the Burundese security sector^{xxv}. In 2009, the Dutch MFA contributed 12 million Euro to the SSD through the Stability Fund and donated 31 military trucks previously used by the Dutch to the Burundese army^{xxvi}.

Partly supported by the advocacy of International Alert, Oxfam Novib and ICCO, the Burundese army and police commanders are very well able to articulate their wishes regarding the gender mainstreaming of their security forces. Such as: more means to recruit women; a PR campaign to support that recruitment; separate trainings and housing facilities for male and female police; norm-building amongst male police staff that it is not ok to use (these) women as prostitutes; a Code of Conducts and a severe regime of sanctions to ensure abidance to that Code of Conduct.

This list of needs reminds of recommendations made in an excellent study by Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (2010), *The Complexity of Violence: a critical analysis of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*, published by Sida. Baaz and Stern interviewed about 226 soldiers and officers of the (unified) Congolese army between 2006 and 2009. Though of course there are differences between the security sectors of Burundi and the DRC, some lessons may be learned from the DRC case that can be of help to strengthen the SSR efforts in Burundi. Such as the insight that a combination of awareness building, and consistent punishment – preferably accompanied by public shaming – is crucial to stop security forces committing violence against civilians, including sexual violence.

How to stop security forces committing violence against civilians

Human rights and IHL training alone do not help to change the high level of human rights abuses committed by Congolese soldiers, unless training is accompanied by a significant shift in terms of impunity and vetting, Baaz and Stern (2010: 37) write. Soldiers interviewed by the researchers stressed the importance of severe punishment to stop them committing violence against civilians and sexual violence, but equally emphasized the importance of public shaming processes, such as public trials and shaming (including the forced removal of military uniform and badges of rank in front of military colleagues) which are in their view a crucial part of a justice process (2010: 38). The impact of such measures is strengthened when combined with an improvement of leadership and the building of positive relationships within the armed forces and between the army and the civilian population, Baaz and Stern argue (2010: 40).

According to a study by Oxfam Novib and ICCO^{xxvii}, violence against civilians and bad relations within security forces also continues to be a problem within the Burundese security forces:

Over the past year, the general security situation in Burundi has considerably improved after the integration of the last rebel group, FNL, into the political, administrative and security scene. Nevertheless, widespread insecurity persists in the form of organised crime, robberies, looting, arbitrary killings, violent settling of scores, sexual and gender based violence, torture, etcetera. (...) Against this backdrop, the Burundian security sector, in particular the police, has proved incapable of fulfilling its tasks. Even worse, it is often implicated in acts of crime. Of the 115 policemen in Pimba prison in 2008, more than half were caught in acts of banditry. (...) Impunity reigns in the sector.

One of the reasons for the continued impunity quoted by the organizations is, 'the integration of former armed groups in the police and army', and here it may again be interesting to learn from some findings of the Sida report on the impact of military integration.

Military integration in the DRC: taking the problem to another level

In a sharp analysis of the historical and institutional context of the Congolese army, Baaz and Stern show that the sexual violence committed by members of the Congolese army, is part of a pattern of violence against civilians that has been institutionalized by (amongst others) a history of extremely hostile civil-military relations. It is a relationship of mutual disrespect in which military are just as much despised by civilians and verbally and physically humiliated as the other way round. Another factor indirectly conducive to violence against civilians, are the internal feuds and conflicts between different commanders, and ethnic groups within the army.

“The historical role of the Congolese army has been to protect ruling regimes against internal opposition. Moreover, as a result of Mobutu’s efforts to prevent the army from destabilizing the regime, the army has itself been divided by “internal” conflicts and unclear, parallel command structures”(2010:18).

Violence against civilians, including sexual violence, tends to be more common in armed forces or armed groups with unclear, parallel or otherwise dysfunctional accountability and command structures (2010:17). The integration of former rebels and militia into the Congolese army has just taken these problems to another level, Baaz and Stern argue (2010: 19) :

“The problems of division and parallel chains of command have increased with the military integration processes chosen after the various peace accords. (...)The general process has been that of mixing *brassage*, that is, of forming new brigades out of units of the main armed groups with the aim of breaking down old loyalties and establishing a unified chain of command.(...) The units often remain responsive to the former belligerents, and not to the integrated command structures, creating parallel chains of command. As such, factors conducive to violence against civilians and sexual violence - such as the realities of civil-military relations in the DRC, learned behaviours, (failed) military integration processes, militarized ideas of masculinity and experiences of imagined (and real) marginalization - are reproduced and maybe even strengthened by the military integration process.”

What is needed instead, Baaz and Stern suggest, quoting a study by Ebenga and N’Landu, “is the creation of an entirely new army with an ideology, structure and organisation unlike anything that has previously existed in the DRC”. Something that was realized in Liberia that chose to “start from scratch”, forming an entirely new army.

Of course, the findings of the DRC-case cannot simply be copy-pasted on Burundi. But one can certainly learn from the general lesson of the importance to transform the ‘militarized ideals of masculinity’ that inform the ideology, structure and organization of the Burundese security sector, in order to stop violence against civilians and sexual violence.

2.4 Gender-responsive peace keeping

Given the major cultural obstacles encountered when wishing to increase the gender sensitivity of a dominantly masculine organization like the Dutch armed forces, the achievements made over the last four to five years can be called a success. Three factors contributed to that success: strong political commitment and attention for gender mainstreaming in the armed forces; strong support and commitment from a handful of high-ranking officers, and; the operational needs of the Dutch mission to Uruzgan.

The political commitment was first shown by former State Secretary of Defense Van der Knaap, who displayed an almost personal commitment to gender mainstreaming in the Dutch forces. In response

to Van der Knaap's instructions, the Dutch army launched the ambitious *Genderforce Project* in 2006, that aimed to mainstream gender in the training and education of the forces, in the policies and operational procedures, in peace missions, and in the recruitment of staff^{xxviii}. 'Now, all those young recruits already receive gender training from the start', Navy Lieutenant Commander Ella van den Heuvel, Gender Advisor in the Dutch forces, said^{xxix}. A major second major boost to the efforts to mainstream gender in the Dutch forces was given by the formulation of a Dutch National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 (NAP 1325) and the subsequent establishment of a NAP 1325 working group. As the Dutch forces operate under instruction of the political leadership of the Dutch government, being able to say that the NAP working group 1325 was a joint project of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and civil-society, greatly helped gaining internal support for this agenda. Besides, because of the NAP 1325, the issue became much firmer established on the political agenda of each of the three co-signing Ministries (FA, Defense and IA), and reappeared on the agendas of various internal meetings and public activities.

The Dutch contribution to ISAF made the need for gender mainstreaming in peace missions not only a matter of policy, but also of practice: of implementation 'in theatre'. Although the issue was already on the agenda, and the gender advisors in the armed forces had explicitly advised the commanders to include gender advisors on the Dutch mission to Uruzgan (which officially started August 2006) it still took a while, until a member of the Provincial Reconstruction team (PRT), was explicitly appointed to focus on gender-issues for the Dutch TFU in 2007. Again, the 'tipping point' seemed to be in the personal commitment of a Commander of the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), who recognized the need and decided to appoint a staff member with the explicit assignment to advise on gender. After that, when the TFU became led by a joint civil-military command, the attention for gender issues and the support of projects for women grew even more. The development cooperation advisor (OSAD) from the Dutch MFA played an important role in keeping the genderfocus in the mission. Though there was still a way to go to gender mainstream the TFU operations, during the years gender has become an important part of the mission of the TFU.

Sweden running ahead

Thus far, only Sweden managed to thoroughly mainstream gender in operations. The top of the military leadership was obliged to attend a gender course of very high quality. After having participated in this course, all these generals and commanders were convinced about the need to incorporate gender. They clearly saw how it would make their operations more effective, reaching the whole instead of half of the population, which is key for military intelligence. And how it could improve strategies to prevent civilian casualties, as 'civilians are where women and children are'. Thus, commanders were trained to consistently assess how their operations differently impact on the men, women and children in the field, and what they can do to mitigate those impacts. After the training, a gender expert pool was established as well as a special gender field advisors course. Now, every mission to which the Swedish contribute has a gender advisor who directly reports to the commander. And this gender advisor in turn appoints gender focal points in the mission.

Within NATO (Sweden is not a NATO member), the Dutch, together with the Swedish, are the front runners where it concerns gender in peace operations. LCDR Ella van den Heuvel is the deputy chair of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives^{xxx}. Since 2006 the Committee has been working on the development of a NATO guidance on 1325, and lobbied to keep the issue on the NATO agenda. Their continuous efforts finally led to the issuing of Guidelines for the integration of UNSCR 1325 into the NATO Command Structure by NATO's Strategic Commands in 2009, and to the first appointment of two gender advisors to the ISAF head quarters in 2009. The Netherlands seconded the first gender advisor to ISAF, in the person of LCDR Ella van den Heuvel, and Norway the second. Together, they were able to build much more gender awareness within ISAF head quarters, and establish many

fruitful contacts with Afghan women organizations. As a consequence of their efforts, the gender advisors position has been moved to a strategic position in the ISAF HQs.

3. Mechanisms for Gender-responsive Peace and State-building

3.1 Funding

Stability Fund

The Dutch Stability Fund was established in 2003 to provide rapid and flexible support to activities at the intersection of peace, security and development in countries and regions that are on the verge of armed conflict, or have experienced situations of armed conflict. The Fund had a budget of € 64 million in 2004, € 110 million in 2005, € 93 million in 2006, and an annual € 77 million were prospected from 2007 onwards. Both ODA and non-ODA activities are eligible for funding.

The 2004-2005 Evaluation of the Stability Fund^{xxi} was extremely critical about the apparent lack of a gender perspective: 'Gender-blindness was one of the shortcomings of the fund. Almost all projects lacked a deliberate gender perspective, which defies the criteria of the fund as well as general policy'. In their response to this sharp conclusion, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation wrote [free translation from Dutch]: 'We do not support to this conclusion. There are activities funded by the Stability Fund, in which gender is simply not an issue. In case this [gender] will be an issue in any of the activities to be funded, gender will be incorporated in the future'. The Ministers refer to UNSC Resolution 1325 to guide the design and implementation of such activities.

The initial reply – that gender was simply not an issue in some activities – confirms the earlier observation that many policy makers tend to equal gender with women, and treat it as a special issue, one set aside from, instead of at the core of establishing stability and security. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in the subsequent reports on the execution of the Stability Fund in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, nothing is reported on the promised incorporation of gender in the Fund. Simultaneously, large portions of the Stability Fund are allocated to national and international military forces, both in the context of Security Sector Reform, international peace keeping missions, and the strengthening of national armies. In 2006, for example, the Stability Fund contributed to financing the Congolese army for joint operations with MONUC; the salaries of soldiers of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); the integration of former rebels in the National Burundese Army, and; a RECAP training for Burundese and Rwandese soldiers. As became clear from above analysis, the command structures and military cultures of armed forces have a big impact on the likelihood of those same forces committing violence against civilians, including sexual violence. It would have been helpful if the reports on the Stability Fund explained, what program elements are incorporated to prevent soldiers (whose salaries are paid by the Fund) from committing violence against civilians or sexual violence – especially where it concerns the financing of military operations. And to add a line on how command structures and military cultures – both in national and international peace keeping forces - are addressed in SSR programs to create a gender sensitive ideology, structure and organization.

Though the Funds continues to heavily focus on funding security institutions, it started adding some conflict prevention and economic recovery activities in 2008 and 2009, thereby seemingly responding to another of the 2004-2005 Evaluation's recommendation, namely: "Do not neglect conflict prevention.". Thus the Stability Fund supported the UN Mediation and Prevention Unit (2 million), the PEAR+ program for economic recovery in the DRC, and contributed 10 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF). We will now have a closer look to the latter.

UN Peace Building Fund (UNPBF)

The UN Peacebuilding Commission was set up in 2005 to help struggling States avoid slipping back into war and chaos by providing strategic advice and harnessing expertise and finance from around

the world to aid with recovery projects. There are currently four countries on its agenda – Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition to support from the PBC, countries can also avail themselves of financial assistance from the Peacebuilding Fund to jump-start rebuilding projects. Prior to the establishment of the PBC, the work of peacekeepers in fragile States too often turned out to be in vain because the phase between the end of the peacekeeping mission and the start of development had not been adequately addressed. From its establishment in 2005 to February 2010, the PBF received a total of USD 334,186,419 from various UN member states, of which 46,456,518 USD was contributed by the Dutch^{xxxii}.

According to the evaluation of the PBF program in Burundi (2010: 1)^{xxxiii}, peace building aims to promote individual, organizational, institutional, and cultural change in a context where this change has not been previously attempted or, if attempted, has been unsuccessful. It focuses on establishing a ‘sustainable national infrastructure for peace that allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with their own skills, institutions and resources’, to quote Kofi Annan again. PBF projects/programs are short-term but aim to achieve behavioral, organizational, institutional, or cultural change. Thus the PBF program in Burundi included activities for social reintegration, economic development, awareness building on the role of youth and women, dialogue between government and civil society, and activities to support peaceful resolution of land disputes. According to the evaluation (2010: 18),

“seven out of 18 projects were both effective in contributing to their project-specific goals and the goals of the PBF: the Dialogue Forums, the Land Disputes Project, a portion of the Local Public Services Project, the Military Barracks Project (including the Displaced Families Project), the Morale Building Project, the National Intelligence Service Project, and the Transitional Justice Project. This evaluation found that the PBF has a comparative advantage in funding interventions that: i) target institutions critical to the prevention of violence in the near future and that are ready for peacebuilding intervention; ii) fill a critical or temporal funding gap (i.e., respectively, gaps created because other donor restrictions prevent them from funding it, or other donors are unable to fund at that time) and; iii) enable national actors to sustain project outcomes”.

Thus, the PBF in Burundi seemed especially successful in implementing an integrated approach, targeting the various vital themes for strategic and sustainable peacebuilding. The projects were implemented by diverse agencies, each using their specific expertise and infrastructure. Making national ownership a central concern, it consistently implemented its projects in cooperation with the responsible national authorities or Ministries. Though much criticism remains to be said about the flaws in management and coordination between all UN bodies and national authorities^{xxxiv} – and will likely be said in the forthcoming review of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the PBF Burundi did according to the Evaluation ‘develop several truly innovative peacebuilding projects that made an important contribution to peace consolidation in Burundi’.

MDG 3 Funds

The MDG3 funds was established by the former Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation Bert Koenders in 2007, to catalyze and support civil society in advancing gender equality, focusing specifically on the gender objectives in the third Millennium Development Goal (ensuring equal rights for women). This was done after an internal study found that virtually no progress had been made on this MDG, and partly in response to research by Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) indicated declining funds available to NGOs to advance women’s rights. The Fund was launched with an initial €50 million, but in response to the enormous demand – 454 organisations applied requesting a total of € 700 million - €20 million were added. Non-governmental organizations were the only organizations eligible for funding. The funding period runs from 1st of January 2008 to June 30, 2011.

According to AWID^{xxxv} the MDG3 Funds was ‘the largest fund ever created with the goal of advancing women’s rights and allocating resources through civil society organizations working to advance women’s rights (particularly women’s organizations)’. AWID uses the Funds as an example of success in the same Brief (see footnote) and is largely positive. Their only comment concerns the extent to which small organizations are able to access the Fund, as ‘the minimum allowed grant amount was €750,000—preventing all but the largest women’s organizations, or groups who could present joint proposals, from accessing the Fund’. (Simultaneously, this problem with accessibility may have been reasonably overcome as the Fund selected eleven proposals that included re-granting support to smaller organizations.)

Though on first sight, the MDG3 Funds seems to fall into the trap of a ‘single focus on women’, a closer look reveals something different. To start with, the four selected areas for funding support^{xxxvi} are not exclusively the stereotyped women’s issues ((maternal) health, education, sexual violence), but include the more ‘masculine’ issues of property rights, women’s representation in politics and employment. Besides, although the Funds’ criteria do not once mention the importance to include men to help change gender stereotypes and unequal power relations, many of the programs selected do incorporate an inclusive approach. Thus, the *Breakthrough Trust*, includes men and women aged 18 to 24 in its ‘Youth Rights Advocates’ program: a comprehensive year-long training program addressing issues such as sexuality, gender, HIV/AIDS, and domestic violence, to provide the youth with capacity and awareness building to empower them to become leaders in their own communities’. And the ‘We Can’ campaign of Oxfam Great Britain ‘seeks to eliminate violence against women at all levels in society by eradicating existing attitudes and patriarchal values’. The campaign already targeted about 2.6 million individuals in 6 countries – women and men – who take up a role as *Change Makers* ‘people who create a positive environment for social change by challenging and changing perceptions and practices that perpetuate violence against women in their own lives’^{xxxvii}. The Funds also seems particularly good at targeting organisations at the regional level.

According to the AWID Brief, the Dutch MFA is reaching out to other bilateral donors and the private sector to explore possibilities to sustain and maybe even expand the MDG3 Fund.

Private Sector Investment

The Dutch have made a good start by being the first to establish a Private Sector Investment Program that specifically focuses on subsidizing Dutch and international companies who wish to start a business with a local partner in fragile states. The so-called PSI+ Program is managed by NL EVD International – an agency of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs – and was launched in 2009. It can already be called a success in terms of meeting a demand. In 2009, 10 million was budgeted but 11 million were allocated. In 2010, the first tender (there are 3 each year) already had more proposals than could be accepted.

The PSI+ supports small to medium business plans with a total of 60% subsidy over the total budget, to a maximum of 1.5 million per applicant. In cooperation with the Funding Agency, a number of benchmarks are established for the project, and the subsidy is only allocated after those benchmarks have been achieved. Though the funding agency does not impose any quota for women employees – they believe it depends on the local context and type of work - applicants do regularly include quota and if that benchmark is not achieved, the subsidy is not allocated. In most cases however, a project officer^{xxxviii} said, more women were eventually employed than initially intended. ‘Probably because once you make people aware and give some stimulus, it works’, the EVD project officer concluded. The EVD does apply the minimal gender criteria that projects should at least not have a negative impact on gender equality, for example by giving very low or lower wages to women. They also look at the recruitment policy and check if women also have positions in (middle) management. There are

several examples of businessmen or women becoming creative in seeking solutions to enhance the employment of women, such as providing a health insurance to the whole family, or providing transport. Besides, they seem to see the gain of recruiting women.

The success elements of the PSI+ are that it concerns small scale projects, with close accompaniment provided by the agency. This seems to facilitate local revenues and will improve the likelihood of the company being embedded in the community. In line with the business mentality, the approach is not too much top-down, but as gender equality is one of the funding criteria, it seems to provide an incentive needed to stimulate creativity amongst business(women) in enhancing the employment of women.

3.2 The 1325 National Action Plan Working Group

On 9 December 2007, the Dutch Government and a large representation of Dutch civil society organizations co-signed the Dutch National Action Plan (NAP) 1325 'to gain systematic recognition and support for women's role in conflict and post-conflict situations, and to identify different stakeholders' responsibility in the process'^{xxxix}. As a follow-up a Working Group on 1325 (WG 1325) was established, consisting of a range of representatives from Dutch NGOs^{xl}, two representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one from the Ministry of Defense, to oversee implementation of the NAP. The working group (WG) is coordinated by a representative of the MFA. During the first two years of its existence, the NAP working group (WG) was struggling with the typical problems encountered by many newly established coalitions. Thus, the evaluation '1 year NAP 1325'^{xli} mentions the need for internal trust-building; lack of clarity on the roles and tasks of WG members; tension between lobby-oriented and programme-oriented members; and the broad nature of the NAP 1325 – covering a vast range of themes and applicable in diverse countries. The mid-term review of May 2010^{xlii} still identifies the patchwork of activities and objectives as a major problem of the NAP WG, but also notes that very few of the activities aim to build or transform judicial, police or political institutions. It also suggests a need to address problems with the internal coordination of NGOs, both between advocacy and program staff, and between HQs and field staff.

As the majority of the NAP WG agreed with above findings, major steps have been taken to create a much stronger focus in the working group. Until the end of 2010, the NAP WG will focus on three themes: (1) the strengthening of female leadership and political participation in 3 or 4 countries by building on local initiatives; (2) the strengthening of support for the implementation of Resolution 1325 in the internal organization, both in the Netherlands and on international level; (3) internal organization and coordination of the NAP working group. Each issue has been allocated to a thematic working group with one coordinator. Though this new approach looks promising, there remain two issues that may still need to be addressed to optimize the effectiveness of the NAP working group new style.

First, the tension between lobby and programme objectives and officers needs to be resolved. As one WG member asked herself: 'How do we relate to each other when one [member] is lobbying the other?'. Including lobby in a working group that aims for 'state-society' cooperation indeed seems an invitation to tension, if not trouble. It may create confusion amongst CS reps about their main role – is it to influence governmental policies or to coordinate and harmonize programs – and frustration and distrust amongst governmental reps – will CS reps use this information against me? Having a mix of advocacy and program officers in the working group seems another ingredient for miscommunication and frustration. To avoid this problem, Dutch NGOs wishing to conduct advocacy on Afghanistan established a separate NGO-only advocacy and communications group in 2006 *outside* the combined 'state-society' Afghanistan Platform that was coordinated by the Ministry. Though it is not automatically said that the Dutch NAP WG should follow this example, they should at

least make a clear separation between groups focusing on program or lobby objectives, appoint program or advocacy officers likewise, and - depending on the lobby objective and target - consider whether it is more effective to be inside or outside the 'state-society' WG.

Secondly, although most WG members are well aware of the need to address societies as a whole – to change unequal gender power relations in conflict-affected countries, there remains a strong tendency to regard women as automatically gender sensitive, and men and as the opposite of that. Thus the draft strategy of the 'new NAP'^{xliii} states that 'both men and women suffer during war, but women are more likely to be the targets of gender-based violence', thus totally ignoring all severe gender-based violence explicitly targeted at men, such as disappearances and killings, forced recruitment by rebels, torture, and being forced to watch or even commit rape of family members. Furthermore, when women's roles in conflict are listed in the same document, besides from being victims, all roles mentioned are 'positive' as in being potential peacemakers and having something to add to improve policies and government. Not one single reference is made to their role in nurturing gender stereotypes, including the subordinate role of women and a stereotyped view of men as perpetrators only and not in need of protection or assistance. Hence, the 'new focus' strategy of the NAP WG risks falling into the trap of a single focus on increasing the number of women in decision-making and leadership, without sufficiently addressing the gender stereotypes that sustain gender inequalities, and that are reproduced by the society as a whole: by men *and* women, by power-holders *and* subordinates.

4. Cordaid and WO=MEN Position

"As study after study has taught us, there is no tool for development more effective than the empowerment of women. No other policy is as likely to raise economic productivity or to reduce child and maternal mortality. No other policy is as sure to improve nutrition and promote health, including the prevention of HIV/AIDS. No other policy is as powerful in increasing the chances of education for the next generation."

Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the UN in, UNICEF (2006) *The State of the World's Children 2007. Women and Children: The Double Dividend of Gender Equality*, New York: UNICEF

Unfortunately, women across the world still bear the brunt of poverty in terms of material deprivation, discrimination, and denial of their basic rights. As a consequence they often have little opportunity to influence the processes and institutions which shape their lives. The under-representation of women in decision-making and agenda-setting at all levels, means that their interests tend to be under-represented in critical policy-making fora. And that their skills, experience, and knowledge are under-utilized.

Cordaid and WO=MEN believe that promoting gender equality is an important part of its development strategy that seeks to enable all people - women and men alike - to escape poverty, to develop their talents, express their needs and ideas, and negotiate these with the broader society.² Cordaid and WO=MEN also believe that in order to attain sustainable development through the empowerment of women, a process of transformative change is needed that addresses the unequal power relations between men and women.

² Cordaid gender vision, K&S October 2004

Human security as fundament for peace and state-building

In Cordaid's and WO=MEN's view, human dignity constitutes the core value of freedom, justice and peace. It is the fundament of the international legal order, and the key principle to guide policies for international relations, defense and development cooperation (3D, Defence, Diplomacy and Development). This approach fits a concept of security that regards state security as essential, but not always sufficient to protect the human dignity of civilians. Human security is a concept that is build on the value of human dignity, instead of on the political and economic interests of states. It is a people-centered approach that emphasizes the prime orientation to the security needs of individual civilians and their communities, as opposed to those of states. In transcending the borders of state interests, human security and peace in the broader sense, can also be regarded as a *global common good* that benefits the larger collective of peoples as it is non-rivalrous and non-exclusionary. The choice for human dignity as the fundament of human security implies the acknowledgment that all civilians, women and men alike, have a right to a secure existence in human dignity.

Transformative change

Underlying the under-representation of women in decision-making are deeply-seated social and cultural beliefs about the particular roles and positions of men and women in their family, community and society. To empower women and promote women's leadership, transformative change is needed that involves the coordinated efforts of men and women in changing existing practices, ideas, and distributions of power and resources that exclude women. Transformative change is both about changing specific decisions affecting people's lives and changing the way decision-making happens into a more inclusive and democratic process. Such change should deal with specific aspects of policymaking, as well as with values and behaviors that perpetuate exclusion and subordination. It is this last level of change – that of underlying values and behaviors – that is often most difficult to achieve because it concerns the level of invisible power: the power that shapes people's beliefs, sense of self and acceptance of their own superiority or inferiority.

Inclusive approach

An important strategy towards the creation of more gender equality is the strengthening of women's participation and leadership in decision making positions. But we should not fall into the trap of stereotyping all women as gender sensitive, and all men as gender blind. Various men stood and stand up for women's rights, and women are known for sustaining traditional, subordinate, positions of women as well. Besides, as ideas of masculinity and patriarchal power are at the root of gender inequality, real change can only come about if men are involved at all stages. As transformative change challenges existing power relations at all levels of society, it is crucial that change is sought through an inclusive approach that minimizes the risks for women who take up leadership positions, and for men who become change-makers in their family, community and society. This requires skillful maneuvering and alternating between strategies that at times challenge existing power relations, and at other times work with them, to gradually expand political space for women's leadership and participation in decision-making.

Concrete Steps

Decision-making happens at the personal, local, national and international level. At all these levels, women can contribute to their own development and the development of their societies if they gain knowledge, insight and confidence to participate in decision-making. Cordaid and WO=MEN facilitate women's organizations, individual human rights defenders and network communities to increase women's informal and formal power at many levels. Cordaid and WO=MEN adopt a two-fold strategy to achieve this aim: we both provide direct support to women organisations and networks that

specifically focus on women's rights, *and* simultaneously strengthen women leadership in organizations and decision-making bodies that work on various, not women-specific, issues of development and security. As such, women can have their own space to define their agendas and work on women specific issues when the need arises. At the same time, we ensure that women's leadership is also strengthened outside the specific institutions that focus on women's rights, and that women's voices are also heard in broader debates on for example security, peace and the environment.

Women's participation in peace processes does not come about without support. In order to have impact, women need to know how peace processes are organized, need to organize themselves and overcome eventual internal divisions so that their voices cannot be ignored. They need to be trained, prepared and supported to 'play the political game'. Cordaid and WO=MEN support women organizations to enhance their knowledge and exchange experiences on political participation with women from other post-conflict countries. And to ensure that men take equal responsibility in opening up political space for women.

5. Recommendations

General

A single focus on women is very unlikely to change a culture of power that sustains gender inequality and the violent resolution of conflict. What is needed is a consistent two-prong approach that helps to set the conditions in politics *and* society for gender responsive leadership in the planning and implementation of peace agreements, DDR, SSR, and peace keeping missions. An approach that:

- (1) supports women and men who are willing and able to be change makers in politics, security forces and government institutions: to be gender responsive leaders and take gender-sensitive decisions in peace and state building. And that simultaneously
- (2) builds strong support for these change makers in politics and society by changing the culture of power into one that supports gender equality and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Such an approach should just as much target all international agencies involved in peace and state-building in fragile states: such as the Boards of the various multi-donor trust funds, the security and peace-building departments at the MFAs of donor countries, the staff members of Embassies in fragile states, and the civil and military staff of international peace keeping and peace enforcing missions. For there remains a tendency within these institutes, to regard gender as 'soft', or at best as a 'women's issue'.

Gender-responsive peace negotiations

General

- Bringing gender expertise on negotiation teams is important, but has to be in the person of someone who has thorough knowledge of the local context and history of the peace process, and who has access to and strong links with women in the conflict area, including female combatants. International donors and agencies who wish to second gender advisors to peace negotiation teams are therefore strongly recommended to appoint local women who possess these qualities, and can - because of their strong local contacts and skills - count on receiving the necessary esteem of the chief mediator and key negotiators.

Afghanistan

- Quick peace deals are a recipe for failing peace deals. Peace deals that include the interests of the whole, instead of only a part of society, are much more likely to succeed. International diplomats should therefore ensure that women's gains are not traded away in any political settlement with insurgent groups, and push for a quota of 25% of women to be present in all peace discussions.
- Using quota to ensure women's participation in peace talks can be effective as long as these women have the ability to represent the interests of their constituencies, have thorough knowledge of the history of the peace process, and have diplomatic and negotiation skills. These capacities, as well as eventual security provisions, can typically be provided through training and assistance programs funded by international donors. The Dutch can step into this niche by , and by appointing one staff member at the RNE, to explore the further needs for security and capacity assistance of Afghan women representatives in the Afghan peace talks.
- The Dutch Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) should provide core funding to the Afghan NGO Afghan Women's Network (AWN) who has proven to be crucial in ensuring increased participation of women in the Peace Jirga, yet is struggling to find enough resources to play this role. The AWN can also play an important role to ensure that criteria of quality and representation are applied to select women representatives, and prevent the quota to be used as mere symbolic token.
- While formal prosecution may be problematic in Afghanistan because it may uproot society and 'open the door to another war', informal transitional justice such as truth-telling and reparation by the perpetrator, may be more realistic and have more chance at success. The Dutch should revive their initial support for transitional justice in Afghanistan, and support such activities, including the strengthening of the vetting mechanisms for senior positions in government, judiciary and security forces.

Gender-responsive DDR

DDR Programme Design

- Labeling gender as a 'special project' risks it being side-lined and perceived as 'an extra', or 'a luxury' instead of as core to the program. Those involved in framing or monitoring the program design, should therefore ensure that the gender-responsiveness of the program is listed amongst the key objectives and key operational principles of DDR programs.
- Gender & security advisors need to be part of the core design and management team(s) from the start. Implementing staff and donor representatives should receive practical instructions on how to consistently check and analyze whether or not the program, and program staff, are gender responsive.
- The selection of the implementing agency should be based on a critical assessment of their local embedding in terms of management infrastructure and local knowledge, and their consequent ability to implement a gender responsive program which success depends on close cooperation with local communities and power brokers, thorough knowledge of the social-economic and security context, and the ability and flexibility to adapt to a continually changing environment. (Hence, UN agencies might be better equipped and positioned to implement DDR programs than the World Bank.)
- When commissioning gender studies and assessments, Dutch representatives at the MFA or RNE need to ensure that the findings are immediately translated into practical directions for program design and implementation.

Economic Reintegration

- The strongest focus and largest financial injection should be on the R (reintegration) of DDR. Female and (lower rank) male combatants are very unlikely to register for DDR programs that offer no viable economic alternatives. International donors therefore need to shift their focus from small economic recovery to the financing of grand economic development projects that stimulate (national) economic growth. (There is for example an urgent need for the building of infrastructures that take production centers out of their isolated positions.)
- Economic reintegration programmes should be designed in such a way that they invite women to participate in non-traditional paid work that substantially increases their income. The opportunity cost of this participation should be minimised by organising interventions which enable women with significant caring responsibilities to take up leadership positions – for example, community day-care for young children. And by ensuring men’s assent and support for this work by carrying out activities emphasising the rationale for women’s participation and the benefits of gender justice to family and community.
- Dutch policy makers at governmental and non-governmental organisations who are involved in the design of reintegration programs, should make a particular effort to improve women’s land and property rights, since this is crucial for increasing their access to and control over vital economic resources. Cooperation with the Dutch ZBO (‘Self-Governing Body’) *Kadaster International* should be explored in this context. *Kadaster International* has ample experience in assisting developing countries to set up or reform their land administration, such as in Rwanda and Afghanistan.

Gender responsive measures and packages

- Create favorable conditions to help female EXCs overcome their fear for stigmatization when ‘coming out’ as former combatant, and establish the necessary capacity and logistics to ensure their access to the DDR program benefits, such as trained staff to receive and support female EXCs. Include women associated with fighting forces (WAFF) in the beneficiary group.
- Reintegration programs for male and female EXCs should all consist of an individual, family *and* community-based package of assistance. The individual packages should be directly delivered to female EXCs, widows and women associated with armed forces and not to the male heads of household or extended family. When accompanied by family packages, this direct distribution is more likely to be accepted by the wider family of the individual beneficiary.

Afghanistan

- In the case of Afghanistan, finance robust infrastructure and development programs to compensate for the weaknesses of the Reintegration Trust Fund – (RTF) which does not include real reintegration programs but merely consists of handing out reinsertion and compensation money to commanders and EXCs. This will increase the chances of sustainable reintegration of former EXCs. Establish this alternative long-term reintegration program under the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. Oppose implementation of the official RTF through the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), as this may likely harm or corrupt an essentially strong mechanism for sustainable – peaceful and participatory – community development.

Gender-responsive SSR

- The Security Sector Development (SSD) programme in Burundi should provide more means to recruit women, such as; a PR campaign to support that recruitment; separate trainings and housing facilities for male and female police and military; norm-building amongst male police and military staff that it is not ok to use (these) women as prostitutes; a Code of Conduct and a severe regime of sanctions to ensure abidance to that Code of Conduct – including public shaming.

- The SSD programme should analyze, monitor and transform the command structure and military culture of the unified Burundese army and police to remove all internal factors that potentially contribute to violence against civilians committed by security forces, including sexual violence (such as unclear or parallel command structures; internal hostilities between units; impunity; weak leadership).
- The SSD programme should trace the (recent) history of civil-military relations between the various units of the Burundese security forces (including newly integrated rebels) and Burundese civilians, and develop – in close cooperation with civilian representatives – programs that reconcile both groups (if needed through truth telling and reparation) and support the building of good civil-military relations, based on trust and mutual support.

Gender-responsive peace keeping

- The new Dutch government and the new Minister of Defense/Security in particular should maintain the Dutch position as gender forerunner in NATO: the new Minister of Defense/Security should instruct the top military leadership to follow the gender field advisors course provided in Sweden, and establish a gender expert pool in the various divisions of the Dutch army.
- The Dutch could furthermore strengthen their position as gender front runner in NATO by providing gender advice to the broader ISAF mission, through the provision of staff, (the financing of) short advisory missions or the provision of courses.

Funding

General

- The number of female beneficiaries should no longer be the sole criteria for funding eligibility, or indicator for gender equality: there is a need for a second criteria/indicator that checks programs against their inclusion of men and the wider community to challenge gender ideals that perpetuate the exclusion of women and cultures of violence.
- The capacity and budget of the RNEs in fragile states will likely be expanded by the new government, as part of the decentralisation process. At least one gender & security advisor should be appointed at each RNE in fragile states. Besides, eventual additional budget should be used to support (1) local and national organizations representing women, and (2) initiatives that support dialogue and cooperation between national or local government and civil society.

Stability Fund

- The Dutch MFA should incorporate a clear gender perspective in the Stability Fund. Not simply by adding some gender sensitization trainings or by increasing the number of female beneficiaries. But by consistently analyzing what program objectives and operational principles need to be incorporated in DDR, SSR and peacekeeping activities, to ensure that (1) armed forces supported by the Stability Fund are not involved in violence against civilians, including sexual violence. And to ensure that (2) command structures and military cultures support the creation of a gender sensitive ideology, structure and organization. The MFA could appoint a gender & security advisor to review the Funds' procedures, criteria, formats and M & E process *together with* Ministerial staff responsible for the management of the Fund, to create the necessary insights and practical tools to achieve this goal.
- Use the UN Peace Building Fund as example to implement a more thorough integrated approach in the Stability Fund.
- The Dutch Permanent Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs, and the Committee for Defence should review the appropriateness of the use of the Stability Fund to establish a short mission pool at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs eg. to pay the salaries of Dutch MFA staff. A more appropriate use of the Stability Fund for capacity building at the MFA could be to have all senior staff of the General Management Security ('Directie Veiligheidsbeleid) and all staff of the

Unit Fragility and Peacebuilding (EFV) follow the gender field advisors course provided by the Swedish.

UN Peacebuilding Fund

- The Dutch Permanent Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Committee for Defence should closely follow the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Fund, and seriously consider various ways to strengthen the Fund and Commission.

MDG3 Funds

- The new Dutch Secretary for Development Cooperation should sustain the MDG3 Funds, and include specific criteria re. the importance of an inclusive approach to address gender stereotypes and power inequalities as sustained by the whole of the community and society.
- Explore the possibility of cooperation with the private sector, f.e. by adding an additional budget line under PSI+ (see below) to support the private sector in opening up their businesses to recruit more women for management positions, or for non-traditional paid work. Those businesses may f.e. need to set up community day-care for young children; organise some family meetings to ensure men's assent and support for this work; providing insurances to the whole family of the employee, and; providing some logistical support to ensure save commuting for women employees.
- Explore closer cooperation – or even merging – with funds of other donors, in particular with Sweden, Norway and Spain who already have similar funds.

Private sector investment

- With an annual budget of between 10 and 15 million, the PSI+ is still quite small and could be expanded, on the condition that the total budget allocated to each applicant remains the same (to continue targeting local businesses) as well as the intensity of accompaniment from NL EVD International.
- Agriculture and transport seem to be the sectors most frequently funded by the PSI+. It would be good to explore to what extent specific budget lines can be developed to support the set-up of agricultural businesses in post-conflict areas, and how these can be stimulated to recruit returnees and female and male EXCs. Cooperation with Kadaster International to support those businesses in getting the proper land and property deeds would be an interesting additional angle to be explored, especially if such a Public Private Partnership – that would of course include the local government – would look at ways to enhance women's access to property and land rights.
- Simultaneously, as already said above, it is vital to stimulate economic and infrastructural development projects on a much larger scale in fragile states to prevent a fall back into conflict. The WRR-report, 'Less pretension, more ambition. Development aid that makes a difference' (2010) mentions water and agriculture as two sectors the Dutch should focus on in future development cooperation.
- The Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs together with NL EVD International and Dutch NGOs should organize a seminar with large Dutch based companies to discuss the McKinsey study *The Business of Empowering Women* and explore what all parties can do to economically empower women in developing countries and fragile states. The Private Sector's Chapter of the Cordaid – GNWP's Study on Costing and Financing 1325 can also be used as input for this seminar.
- Dutch NGOs and MPs should use business logic and positive slogans to convince the new Dutch government of the need to invest in gender responsive (economic) development in fragile states. Such as: 'You can double your national economic growth rate by equally targeting women

through your national budget’, or, ‘If you give women access to power, the terrorism threat will drop down’, or ‘If you give women access to power, migration rates to Europe will decrease’.

1325 NAP Working Group

- Strongly cooperate with and advise the Dutch Chair of the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) to help them integrate a strong gender perspective in the soon-to-be-released OECD Guidelines for State-building. And to help them prepare for their upcoming (October) meeting with the OECD Network on Gender Equality.
- The tension between lobby and programme objectives (and officers) needs to be resolved. The new strategy for the NAP WG should make a clear separation between groups focusing on program or lobby objectives and appoint program or advocacy officers accordingly. Besides, lobby groups should assess whether - depending on the lobby objective and target - it is more effective to operate inside or outside the NAP WG.
- Ensure that the draft ‘new focus’ strategy of the NAP 1325 WG does not fall into the trap of a single focus on increasing the number of women in decision-making and leadership. The strategy needs to consistently addresses the gender stereotypes that sustain gender inequalities, and that are reproduced by the society as a whole: by men *and* women, by power-holders *and* subordinates.
- Address the distrust and hesitance of Dutch diplomats to invite CS representatives to participate in the design and planning of state and peacebuilding programs, for example by jointly constructing lists of female and male CS representatives for each of the 3 selected countries. These women and men should be well situated to represent the views of marginalized women and men, and able to come with constructive proposals. Training and assistance may need to be given (and funded) to help strengthen their representational and analytical skills.
- Dutch civil society should furthermore make a real effort to coordinate and harmonize their programs at country level, as well as their research and advocacy efforts. The NAP 1325 needs to be mainstreamed in existing security and peacebuilding funds and policies. Eventual fear for ‘losing’ attention for gender if it is mainstreamed can be overcome by establishing clear guidelines, criteria and indicators, much according to the lines suggested above. And by advocating for a continuation of the MDG3 funds as recommended above.

For further information:

Cordaid:

Dewi Suralaga: dewi.suralaga@cordaid.nl
www.cordaid.nl

WO=MEN:

Elisabeth van der Steenhoven: e.vandersteenhoven@wo-men.nl
www.wo-men.nl

End notes

ⁱ See: *A New Weave of Power, People & Politics: The Action Guide for Advocacy and Citizen Participation*, by Lisa VeneKlasen and Valerie Miller (2002): page 51. Published by World Neighbors.

ⁱⁱ Also see 'Women's Leadership and Participation in Decision-Making: A Cordaid Lobby Position Paper', April 2010.

ⁱⁱⁱ Quote by Kofi Annan, see: UN General Assembly, *Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict*, p.16 [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/HVAN-6SXRAN/\\$file/UNGA-conflictprev-July2006.pdf?](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/HVAN-6SXRAN/$file/UNGA-conflictprev-July2006.pdf?)

^{iv} These researches can be ordered at Cordaid. Please contact Dewi Suralaga, email: dewi.suralaga@cordaid.nl

^v See Smits, R., "VN-Resolutie 1325: Genderbeleid op een dwaalspoor – Vraagtekens bij toepasbaarheid voor gendersensitief fragiele-statenbeleid", *De Internationale Spectator*, 64:10, October 2010, for a very strong argument supporting this analysis.

^{vi} Below analysis is based on a research study that was presented by Rosan Smits, Research Fellow of the Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael, during the expert meeting 'Together for Transformation – Men, Masculinities and Peacebuilding' organized by International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) on May 27, 2010 - see page 6 of the report on this expert meeting, which is available on: http://www.ifor.org/WPP/Newsitems/May27_2010_Report_final.pdf. The three policy papers studied for this Clingendael analysis are: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), *Developing the security sector: security for whom, by whom? Security sector reform and gender*. The Hague.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), *Naar een menswaardig bestaan: een mensenrechtenstrategie voor het buitenlands beleid*. (Free translation "Towards Human Dignity: A Human Rights Strategy for Foreign Affairs") The Hague.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008), *Veiligheid en ontwikkeling in fragiele staten. Strategie voor de Nederlandse inzet 2008-2011*. (Free translation "Security and development in fragile states: strategy for Dutch involvement 2008-2011") The Hague.

^{vii} Also see Baaz and Stern 2010: 14, '...', the storyline of GBV in the DRC has been embedded in a limited understanding of gender, which conflates sex with gender [and women] and ignores the many ways in which wartime gendered violence also affects men and boys'.

^{viii} Thus, according to the OECD-DAC Gender Marker 2007/2008, the 'gender equality focused aid' of the Dutch only targeted the sectors of 'education', 'health' and 'other social infrastructure including women's equality'. The sectors 'economic infrastructure', 'production', 'multi-sector' remained untargeted. Same tendency visible amongst Dutch NGOs.

^{ix} Schoofs, S. & Smits, R. (2010), "Aiming High, Reaching Low – Four Fundamentals for Gender-Responsive State-building", Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, Policy Brief #13, p. 1.

^x I have adopted this term from Sylvia Borren, former General Director at Oxfam Novib, who used it as an illustration for effective policy influencing.

^{xi} See: *The Business of Empowering Women*, a white paper produced by the management consulting firm McKinsey in collaboration with the Global Private Sector Leaders Forum (PSLF), an initiative of the World Bank Group's Gender Action Plan to promote women's economic empowerment. Available on: http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/Social_Sector/our_practices/Economic_Development/Knowledge_Highlights/empowering_women.aspx

^{xii} To give some examples: Only one representative of civil society sat in the Advisory Group of the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program. When the Netherlands were requested to organize an Afghanistan Top in March 2009, Dutch CS representatives and policy makers at the Dutch MFA had to go at length to confirm the more senior Ministerial staff about the need to include representatives from Afghan civil society. In the uprun to the more recent Top in London, January 2010, decision-makers from international governments remained unresponsive to requests from both in- and outside the Ministries to invite Afghan women representatives from, and only did so after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explicitly asked them to.

^{xiii} See 'Speech by Yoka (Joke) Brandt, Director-General for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the presentation of the Geuzen Medal to Betty Bigombe', 15 March 2010. Available on: http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/Actueel/Toespraken/2010/03/Geuzen_Medal_to_Betty_Bigombe

^{xiv} The below is largely based on an interview with Yoka Brandt, Director-General International Cooperation of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held on September 1, 2010

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- ^{xv} De Waal, Alex (2010), 'Dollarised: the political marketplace and the folly of 'state-building'', in *London Review of Books*, Vol. 32 No. 12, 24 June 2010.
- ^{xvi} Findings and excerpts taken from the research 'Protecting Security and Women's Rights in Afghanistan', conducted by Sarah Smiles Persinger, Researcher at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, USA, commissioned by Cordaid.
- ^{xvii} Catherine Mayer, "London Afghanistan Conference Glosses over the Cracks," January 29 2010. Time Magazine. Available online at <<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1957537,00.html>>
- ^{xviii} Interview with activist involved in supporting the Afghan Women's Network gain access to the London conference, February 2010.
- ^{xix} Most of the below findings are taken from the *End of Program Evaluation, Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)*, conducted by the Norwegian consultancy bureau Scanteam, April 2010.
- ^{xx} Notably: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Central African Republic (CAR)
- ^{xxi} Draft report, 'Draft 1 Genre DDR 15.06.2010', by Leo ???
- ^{xxii} The draft report mentioned having interviewed representatives from about 70 mostly civil society organisations: those engaged in lobby activities to promote women's participations, NGOs combating violence against women, women organizations promoting human rights, and organizations involved in the economic and psychosocial reintegration of EXCs.
- ^{xxiii} Association des Femmes Intellectuelles et Lettrées au Maniema – Association of Intellectual and Literate Women Maniema.
- ^{xxiv} Director of Centre Uhai Kykio in Butembo.
- ^{xxv} See: 'Kamerbrief inzake levering van gebruikt Defensiematerieel aan Burundi', March 8, 2010 and 'Kamerbrief inzake ontwikkeling veiligheidssector in Burundi', July 10, 2009. Both available on www.minbuza.nl/nl/Actueel/Kamerstukken
- ^{xxvi} Please note: these are the Dutch contributions as traceable through public documents, but there may and is likely to be more.
- ^{xxvii} 'Ensuring Protection-Oriented Security Sector Development: Challenges, Improvements and Gaps', A briefing note by ICCO and Oxfam Novib, January 2010.
- ^{xxviii} See: 'Genderforce: Vrouwen en mannen presteren samen beter', publication by Dutch Ministry of Defense 2005?, available on: www.defensie.nl/_.../generaldownloadHandler.ashx?.../Genderforce...
- ^{xxix} Interview on August 24, 2010.
- ^{xxx} See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50327.htm for more info.
- ^{xxxi} *Evaluation Stability Fund 2004 and 2005*, by Bart Klem and Georg Frerks, February 2007. Available on: <http://www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:28731&type=pdf>
- ^{xxxii} <http://www.unpbf.org/pledges.shtml>
- ^{xxxiii} See: *Independent external evaluation UN Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*, by Susanna P. Campbell with Leonard Kayobera and Justine Nkurunziza, March 2010. Available on: <http://binub.turretdev.com/en/images/articles/1964.pdf>
- ^{xxxiv} See for example a review of the PBF as commissioned by ao the Dutch, with some critical feed-back and recommendations about the technical aspects of the PBF management, Review of the Peacebuilding Fund by Nicole Ball and Mariska van Beijnum, June 4, 2009, available on: http://www.unpbf.org/docs/PBF_review.pdf
- ^{xxxv} See: *2009-2010 FundHer Research update Brief 1: Trends in Bilateral and Multilateral Funding*, by: Lydia Alpizar, Cindy Clark, Alexandra Pittman, Sarah Rosenhek, and Verónica Vidal February 2010. Available on: <http://www.awid.org/eng/About-AWID/AWID-News/Brief-1-FundHer-Research-Update-Brief-Series>
- ^{xxxvi} effective property and inheritance rights for women; formal employment and equal employment opportunities; participation and representation of women in politics and public administration; stopping violence against women.
- ^{xxxvii} All info quoted in this paragraph can be found on: http://www.minbuza.nl/en/Key_Topics/Millennium_Development_Goals_MDGs/Dutch_aim_for_MDG_3/MDG3_Fund
- ^{xxxviii} Interview with Paul Schoenmakers, Project Officer PSI at NL EVD International, June 17, 2010.
- ^{xxxix} See: "Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325: Taking a stand for women, peace and security", December 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pg. 6. Available on: <http://www.ifor.org/WPP/nap-1325%20Dutch.pdf>

^{xl} Such as: Aim for human rights, Cordaid, ICCO, Gender Concerns International, IKV-Pax Christi, Oxfam Novib, Platform Vrouwen voor Duurzame, Vrede, Multi-cultural Women for Peace and Freedom, Women's Global Network for Reproductive, Rights and the Women's Peacemakers Programme of IFOR.

^{xli} '1 year NAP 1325: evaluating the Dutch National Action Plan on UNSC Resolution 1325 after one year of implementation', by Herma Majoor and Megan L. Brown, December 2008. Available on: http://www.ifor.org/WPP/Newsitems/Final_Report_Eval_NAP_1325_12Dec2008.pdf

^{xlii} Internal document 'Halfweg - Halverwege: Monitoring het Nationaal Actieplan 1325 "Op de bres voor vrouwen, vrede en veiligheid" (2008-2011)'.

^{xliii} Internal draft document, 'The new focus of the NAP 1325', July 2010.