

**THE FEMINIST FOREIGN
POLICY INDEX**

A QUANTITATIVE
EVALUATION OF
FEMINIST COMMITMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY INDEX TOOL

This report is complemented by a digital tool that provides a comprehensive visualization of the results, together with the policy recommendations. To gain access to the digital Feminist Foreign Policy Index tool, please visit www.FFPIIndex.org or scan the QR Code.



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ABBREVIATIONS

BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty
CEDAW	Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
FFP	Feminist Foreign Policy
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IFFS	Illicit Financial Flows
ILO	International Labor Organization
ISDS	Investor–State Dispute Settlement
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
MLI-BEPS	Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
NAP	National Action Plan
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WPS	Women Peace and Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Feminist Foreign Policy Index (FFP Index) is a quantitative framework that explores **what a feminist foreign policy could be**. It adapts a methodology developed in 2017 by Christine Alwan and S. Laurel Weldon to evaluate feminist foreign policy. We propose an expanded model that envisions FFP as a tool for systems change and evaluates both the role countries play in perpetuating some key contemporary challenges and inequalities, including gender inequality, and their efforts to address them.

The Index comprises 27 indicators that together evaluate 48 countries that are members, candidates for accession, or key partners of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) across seven priority areas: peace and militarization; official development assistance (ODA); migration for employment; labor protections; economic justice; institutional commitments to gender equality; and climate. Country scores for the Index range from 0 (weak integration of feminist commitments) to 1 (strong integration of feminist commitments).

The Index is not an evaluation of existing FFP frameworks. However, it is intended to more sharply conceptualize FFP and to offer a template for cross-country comparison that could incentivize change and serve as an accountability mechanism. **It is informed and inspired by feminist advocacy and amplifies feminist calls for peace, equality, justice, and environmental integrity.** The FFP Index does not comprise an exhaustive list of issue areas or indicators but prioritizes those with potential to transform unequal global structures, as well as those that can improve coherence between domestic and international policies for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity. As a policy tool, the FFP Index provides a quick snapshot of regional and global peers, as well as thematic areas of strength and improvement that countries can prioritize when developing or revising their FFP framework.

Sweden ranks first in the Index, indicating that it has embedded a feminist approach to most—if not all—areas of its foreign policy. Latin America

Key overall findings that emerged from our analysis include:

- Of the 48 countries evaluated, Sweden (0.8) leads the group, followed by Norway (0.73), Mexico and Finland (0.67), Costa Rica and Peru (0.65), Germany (0.63), South Africa, Chile and Argentina (0.62), Luxembourg (0.61), Portugal (0.6), Colombia and Belgium (0.59), and Spain (0.58).
- Country scores range from 0.12 (United States) to 0.8 (Sweden), with a median of 0.52 (Switzerland, Canada, Lithuania).
- Ten countries implementing or developing an FFP were also assessed as a group, with scores ranging from 0.52 (Canada) to 0.8 (Sweden), with a median of 0.6.
- The United States (0.12), India (0.24), China (0.28), Türkiye (0.31), and Israel and Korea (0.34) are the countries with the five lowest scores.

is also performing well, pointing to the region's potential in feminist policymaking at the global level. Considering that the top 10 spots are shared between Latin American and European countries, and half of them have declared an FFP, we encourage closer cooperation between partners at an international level to promote knowledge sharing and an alignment of policies.

We hope that this is a timely contribution that can encourage deeper reflection and bolder action in governments that already apply a feminist lens to their foreign policies, and present those considering declaring an FFP—particularly governments in the Global South—with an array of policy options to incorporate in their frameworks.

INTRODUCTION

Feminist foreign policy (FFP) seeks to disrupt racist, colonial and patriarchal power dynamics by prioritizing peace, gender equality, and environmental integrity across all levers of foreign policy.¹ Eight years after Sweden introduced this new approach in 2014, feminist foreign policy continues to expand: as of December 2022, 13 countries are applying a feminist lens to their foreign and/or development policies, more countries in Europe and Latin America are considering developing their own frameworks, and civil society in countries including Australia, Finland, India, and the United States continues to push governments to declare an FFP or strengthen commitments to gender equality in line with FFP theory and practice.²

The conceptual paradigm that has emerged as more countries followed Sweden centers on a rights-based, intersectional, and inclusive approach to foreign policy, aiming to advance gender equality by prioritizing the rights of women and girls in all their diversity, promoting their representation and leadership at all levels of decision-making, and dedicating adequate resources to the achievement of these goals. Priority areas typically include peace and security; development aid; gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual and reproductive health and rights; economic empowerment; and environment and climate action.³

However, civil society has pointed to gaps in the implementation of current FFP models, critiquing the “conceptual muddiness” in their framing, language, vision, and principles; the contradictions between domestic and foreign obligations and policies; and the lack of a consensus definition or cross-country comparison of the impact of FFP.^{4,5,6} Current approaches tend to adopt a narrow agenda that prioritizes representation and diversity and is based on a development cooperation model shaped by national security and business

interests.⁷ By focusing on individuals rather than systems, current FFP approaches often elevate some identities and rights while failing to consider intersecting and entrenched asymmetrical political, economic, and societal power hierarchies that reproduce inequalities, or to question the implementing countries’ own positioning within global systems of inequality.

To address these gaps and sustain momentum, **ICRW developed the FFP Index to facilitate countries’ efforts to institutionalize and standardize FFP in a productive and meaningful way**, based on a set of indicators selected to capture both how countries are perpetuating some of the key contemporary global challenges and drivers of inequalities, including gender inequality, as well as their efforts to address them. **The Index is intended as a guidance tool for policy makers, laying out an array of available options and grouping together peers to facilitate comparison and knowledge sharing.**

After providing an overview of the evolution of FFP and the corresponding need for an FFP Index to assess countries’ performance on this front, this report describes the methodology used to identify the indicators and priority areas evaluated in the Index. It then discusses findings and recommendations for each priority area and concludes with overall country rankings for the FFP Index and recommendations for policy makers.

THE FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY INDEX EVOLUTION AND PURPOSE

Militarized, exclusionary security approaches have become the norm in conflict resolution and

peacebuilding, migration, law enforcement, and even development, with aid increasingly allocated on the basis of strategic security and business priorities rather than need.⁸ Economies that privilege the proliferation of arms undermine the ability of governments to mobilize domestic resources to fund services for the realization of women's human rights.⁹ Additionally, the current economic and trade system often exploits wage gaps and women's cheap labor and includes policies, such as investor-state dispute settlement provisions and unfair tax agreements, that provide multinational corporations with unchecked power to shift profits and obstruct domestic legislation for women, other marginalized groups and/or the environment.^{10,11}

Feminists have long argued that the effects of multiple intersecting crises on women's human rights, economic justice, and climate justice cannot be addressed or mitigated without systemic change.¹² Yet, FFPs have often struggled to translate this robust analytical framework into actionable, coherent, structural solutions beyond commitments to increasing women's representation and/or nominal increases in funding for gender equality. They have often also struggled to balance their policies with their national interests, particularly with regard to industries and sectors that contribute to human rights violations, environmental degradation or illicit financial flows elsewhere.¹³ They have often favored soft law approaches over legally binding instruments and tend to ring-fence emerging issues, such as global tax governance, in intergovernmental processes where power and representation asymmetries persist.¹⁴

The Feminist Foreign Policy Index, premised on an understanding of gender inequality as the outcome of a system of mutually reinforcing global inequalities, is a quantitative framework that helps assess countries' progress toward uptake of feminist commitments in foreign policy. Informed and inspired by feminist movements and foundational documents such as the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the Addis

Ababa Action Agenda, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Women Peace and Security agenda and others, **the FFP Index identifies and proposes concrete measures to address global inequalities, offering a snapshot of policy options for decision-makers that extends beyond development activities and financing.**

It is intended to facilitate meaningful comparison among peers and highlight efforts toward gender equality from diverse contexts and regions around the world that will inspire action toward transformative change.

The ultimate goal of the FFP Index is to enable countries to work together to create an even more ambitious vision for a feminist foreign policy that prioritizes:

- **A significant investment in peace and human security**, based on the reduction of military and arms proliferation expenditure and the ratification of foundational disarmament treaties and protocols.
- **An innovative, trust-based collaboration model between feminist movements and official development assistance (ODA) donor governments**, with 100 percent of ODA incorporating gender objectives and at least 20 percent targeting gender equality as a principal objective. The collaboration model should also result in more funds directed to women's rights organizations and feminist movements, while also maintaining sufficient ODA levels in line with the 0.7 percent as share of gross national income (GNI) goal.
- **A rights-based approach to migration**, both tackling its underlying structural causes and identifying gender-sensitive policies and approaches to facilitate safe and orderly migration. These include strengthening the participation and leadership of migrant women, repealing discriminatory laws and restrictions on migration, strengthening legal protections and access to remedies, and adopting non-discriminatory family reunification schemes and residency regulations.

- **The ratification of fundamental labor standards**, with a special focus on International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 190 on violence and harassment in the world of work, and, more broadly, an interrogation of current economic, trade, and labor practices that may be contributing to inequalities, including gender inequality, in global value chains.
- **A reimagining of current approaches to global economic justice**, starting with a rethinking of the position of women in the global economy and the impact of inequitable financial, industrial, and investment relationships on gender equality.
- **Accelerated efforts to realize existing climate commitments** that recognize women's agency and leadership in climate change mitigation and sustainable resource management.
- **Ratification of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and increasing women's meaningful representation** at all levels of decision-making and leadership in all of the priority areas outlined in this Index.

ABOUT THE INDEX

The Feminist Foreign Policy Index builds on a quantitative evaluation framework developed in 2017 by Christine Alwan and S. Laurel Weldon, which defined feminist foreign policy through a set of indicators primarily focused on women's inclusion in the foreign policy executive, in the military, and in combat; women's rights in international conventions; advocacy on violence against women; and women's human rights in conflict and post-conflict, among others.¹⁵

The FFP Index proposes an expanded methodology, with priority areas and indicators selected for their potential both to highlight the global linkages between structural drivers of gender inequality and to strengthen coherence between domestic and foreign commitments.

The dataset for the FFP Index comprises 48 countries that are members, candidates for accession, or key partners of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), enabling comparison across a diverse but broadly similar set of countries and economies.¹⁶ As of December 2022, 10 countries in the dataset are implementing or have announced an FFP.¹⁷

METHODOLOGY

Indicator selection

A literature review was conducted to identify FFP indicators. Reviewed literature included academic papers, articles and opinion pieces, studies of current and prospective feminist foreign policies, government declarations, reports from civil society consultations on FFP, position papers by women's rights groups, reports, databases and outcome documents by multilateral organizations, and indices or quantitative frameworks developed by multilateral or civil society organizations.

Indicators were selected on the basis of their conceptual relevance to the FFP framework; their internal consistency and reliability, which was evaluated through positive and statistically significant correlations indicating that they reflect the same underlying construct and are not redundant; and the quality and reliability of their data. Efforts were made to include both quantitative indicators (typically related to funding and representation) and support for multilateral normative frameworks, to broaden the scope of available policy options beyond monetary considerations and highlight the value of collective engagement in multilateral spaces. Where possible, priority areas include indicators to measure both if and how countries are contributing to structural inequalities, and policies they can implement to mitigate or address the impact of such inequalities. Indicators were also selected for their potential to improve coherence between domestic and international policies.

FFP Index development

Once the indicators were identified, variables were organized in seven priority areas in the dataset, and imputations for missing values were performed. All qualitative variables pertaining to ratification of conventions/treaties/protocols were coded so that 0 indicates no signature; 0.5 indicates signature but not full ratification; and 1 indicates full ratification. Ordinal and interval variables were coded so that higher values indicate better performance on the Index. Data on expenditure and/or financial contributions were normalized per capita, if they were not already in the original dataset. Data collection and analysis concluded in December 2022.

To construct the Index, two conceptual models were developed, using the same indicators arranged in different priority areas. All indicators

were weighted equally in both models. Pairwise correlations for the indicators in each of these priority areas were examined to ensure that they were positive and statistically significant. Country scores were generated by taking the geometric mean for each priority area. Considering the small number of variables in each of the priority areas, the geometric mean was considered less sensitive to extreme values and thus more reflective of overall performance across all variables in the priority area, compared to the arithmetic mean. After priority area scores were generated, pairwise correlations between them were examined for direction and statistical significance. At this stage, the scale reliability of both conceptual models was tested with Cronbach's alpha, and the model presented in this report prevailed. Priority area scores were then rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and the final scores for the FFP Index were generated by taking the arithmetic mean of all priority areas.

LIMITATIONS

In "Priority Area III: Migration," Colombia, Peru, and Costa Rica were missing values for the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) indicator. Based on other research available, Colombia and Peru were assigned a value equal to the average of Mexico and Chile.¹⁸ In a similar analysis, Costa Rica's migrant integration policies were evaluated as Medium, which would correspond to the Halfway Favorable (41-59) score range on the MIPEX.¹⁹ Therefore, Costa Rica was assigned the median of the Halfway Favorable range, i.e. 50.

Priority Area II: ODA presented a challenge in terms of missing values because only 29 of the 48 countries in the dataset are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and provide official development assistance.²⁰ It was therefore decided that instead of imputing values, the Index would be calculated in a two-step process, first generating scores for each group of countries separately, and then merging the two groups to construct the final Index.

More broadly, the selection of indicators and production of indices is not merely a technical exercise, but an implicit normative process involving complex decisions and trade-offs on how to move from general principles to operational policies. Even legitimate answers, however, can be further complicated by the absence of comparable data. Intersectionality, for example, has not been fully addressed in this proposed framework, particularly as it relates to a binary understanding of gender. Indicators on the representation of LGBTIQ+ people, for example, or those capturing efforts at the global foreign policy level to protect and promote the rights of gender-diverse and non-binary people were not available.

Relatedly, measuring the actual impact of feminist foreign policy is difficult, particularly in the absence of concrete evidence of effectiveness. Normative frameworks, for example, are not always successfully implemented. However, their ratification (or their consistent non-ratification) is evaluated in this Index as an indication of an openness to cooperation and respect for global norms. Similarly, counting women in the room does not tell us much about their power to shape decisions. Financial commitments do not always produce gender-sensitive outcomes, and the methodology for evaluating these commitments has its own limitations. Acknowledging these challenges, the FFP Index uses these indicators as signals of commitment to policies that can advance gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity.

Many of the indicators selected for this Index do not specifically discuss or focus on gender or women's rights. However, they are included and evaluated as a set of minimum standards for all, which can be complemented and strengthened with more gender-sensitive frameworks, where applicable. This is why ratification of CEDAW is included in Priority Area VI: Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality. The Convention and its Recommendations are both an overarching commitment to gender equality, and the blueprint to complement other multilateral frameworks that may or may not

specifically address gender.

Finally, this Index is one of many possible combinations of indicators and priority areas. We ensured that priority areas and indicators were drawn from multilateral fora or the demands and goals of feminist coalitions and constituencies, as well as the three-year consultation process that led to the publication of the FFP Framework developed by the Global Partner Network for FFP. An earlier draft of this Index was shared with members of the Network, and partners submitted expert views on priority areas, indicators, and the overall methodology.²¹ Their feedback was incorporated in the final product, where possible.

FFP INDEX PRIORITY AREAS AND INDICATORS

The FFP Index comprises 27 indicators which are grouped into seven priority areas:

- **Peace and militarization:** 5 indicators on the volume of a country's arms exports, military expenditure, the ratio of spending on health and education to military expenditure, support for normative disarmament frameworks, and the adoption of a costed National Action Plan on Resolution 1325.
- **Official Development Assistance:** 3 indicators on gender-equality focused ODA, ODA as the share of a country's GNI, and funding for Sector Code 15170: Women's Rights Organizations and Movements, and Government Institutions.
- **Migration for employment:** 3 indicators on migrant integration policies, and ratification of ILO Convention 97 on migration for employment and Convention 189 on domestic workers.
- **Labor protections:** 3 indicators on ratification of ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association, Convention 98 on collective bargaining, and Convention 190 on violence and harassment in the world of work.
- **Economic justice:** 5 indicators on financial secrecy enabling tax avoidance and illicit

financial flows; investment dispute settlements; ratification of the OECD convention to prevent base erosion and profit shifting; endorsement of the Buenos Aires declaration on trade and women's economic empowerment; and national action plans on business and human rights and support for a relevant international legally binding instrument.

- **Institutional commitments to gender equality:** 3 indicators on the percentage of women in ministerial level positions, seats held by women in national parliaments, and ratification of CEDAW without reservations.
- **Climate:** 5 indicators on carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP); the representation of women in party delegations in climate negotiations; contributions to the Green Climate Fund; net-zero pledges; and gender-sensitive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

ANALYSIS

PRIORITY AREA I PEACE AND MILITARIZATION

The advancement of human security through the peaceful resolution of conflicts, disarmament, demilitarization, and peacebuilding efforts that center the experiences of women and marginalized communities has been a core tenet of feminist activism, supported by a robust international normative framework: the UN Charter commits to the establishment and maintenance of peace “with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources to armaments”; Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development calls for the promotion of peaceful, just, and inclusive societies; CEDAW notes that disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, can promote social progress and development and contribute to the attainment of gender equality; the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action highlights the impact of armed conflict on women; and the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda promotes women’s

equal and meaningful participation in peace processes, conflict prevention and resolution, and peacebuilding.^{22,23,24,25,26} However, militarized approaches to peace and security continue unchecked. Such approaches undermine peace, violate human rights, divert funds to armaments and military budgets, consistently exclude women from meaningful engagement with ongoing peace processes, and contribute to environmental degradation.^{27,28}

Indicators

This priority area measures: 1) the volume of arms transfers, 2) military expenditures, 3) the ratio of health and education spending to military expenditure, 4) ratification of key disarmament normative frameworks, and 5) the adoption of a National Action Plan (NAP) for Resolution 1325



on Women Peace and Security that is fully costed and is discussing both domestic and international issues affecting the security of women and girls in all their diversity. For a full list of indicators, sources and coding, please see Annex I.

Arms Transfers

Recognizing the gendered impact of armed violence and conflict and the link between arms and GBV, feminists have been advocating for an end to the international arms trade for over 100 years.²⁹ The prevention of armed conflict is one of the pillars of the WPS agenda, with three of the ten resolutions in the agenda (2106, 2122 and 2467) explicitly referencing the Arms Trade Treaty and its requirement for ex ante assessments of the risk of GBV.³⁰ And yet, between 2012–16 and 2017–21, arms exports from the United States grew by 14 percent; those from France by a staggering 59 percent; and imports to Europe increased by 19 percent.³¹ The nine nuclear-armed states continue to modernize their arsenals, sharpening their rhetoric and undermining efforts at transparency.³² Even

countries championing the WPS agenda and implementing an FFP have often struggled to reconcile their normative commitments and aspirations with the activities of their arms industries.

This priority area measures the average per capita volume of arms exports between 2014 and 2021 as an indication of a commitment to universal disarmament and the prevention of armed conflict and GBV.

Military expenditure and ratio of health and education expenditure to military expenditure

The security and economic systems implicated in responses to global issues such as conflict, migration, climate change, and health emergencies have remained resistant to reform or regulation.³³ Global military expenditure passed the \$2 trillion mark in 2021, sustaining its growth for the seventh consecutive year without any countervailing pressure from the

ARMS EXPORTS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY

- France is the third largest arms exporter, accounting for 11 percent of global arms exports in 2017–21. On average, more than 25 percent of French exports have gone to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.^{45,46} In early 2021, France officially launched a program to develop a third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.⁴⁷
- Germany remains the fourth biggest arms exporter in the world and has repeatedly authorized exports that violate international human rights and humanitarian law.⁴⁸ In 2020, Germany approved over €1 billion in arms deals to countries involved in conflicts in Yemen and Libya.^{49,50}
- Together, the European Union's member states are second only to the United States in the volume of arms they export and accounted for almost one-third of all arms exports from 2014–2018, mainly to the Middle East.⁵¹
- The Spanish government has failed to pay sufficient attention to the recommendations of the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, continuously granting licenses for a steady flow of military goods to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.⁵²
- Sweden's 2019 OECD Development Cooperation Peer Review noted that Sweden scored poorly on security due to its "high share of arms export to countries with poor human rights records and undemocratic regimes."⁵³

pandemic and the economic slowdown it caused, or consideration for unmet humanitarian needs or for climate financing gaps.^{34,35} Recent research has shown that military spending dwarfed pandemic-related fiscal measures—especially those related to population health—in much of the world, and further constrained fiscal space for the enactment of policies to address the specific needs of women and girls during the pandemic, such as measures to prevent and respond to violence against women.³⁶

This priority area measures both the volume of military expenditure and the ratio of health and education spending to military expenditure to evaluate the priorities of countries in the dataset.

Ratification of normative disarmament frameworks

The international community has developed a robust normative framework to regulate the arms trade, control the flow of small arms and weapons, prohibit anti-personnel mines, and promote nuclear disarmament.

This priority area evaluates ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty, the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention, the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a signal of a strong commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation. Feminists have engaged with or led these processes to ensure that they reflect the gendered impacts of arms and nuclear

proliferation and include commitments to prevent or remedy them. The Arms Trade Treaty, for example, recognizes the link between the international arms trade and GBV and introduces a requirement for ex ante assessments of the risk for GBV.³⁷ Similarly, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the first to acknowledge their gendered impact and to mandate gender-sensitive remediation.³⁸

National Action Plans on Security Council Resolution 1325

Because advocacy for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 greatly influenced Sweden's pioneering FFP, the WPS agenda has remained the centerpiece of feminist foreign policies. As of December 2022, 105 countries have adopted NAPs on women, peace, and security that outline initiatives to secure the human rights of women and girls in conflict settings; prevent armed conflict and violence, including against women and girls; and ensure the meaningful participation of women in peace and security.³⁹ However, these plans tend to vary in terms of focus and budget, and few countries discuss threats to peace and security both within and outside their borders in their NAPs. Furthermore, they are rarely fully costed or accompanied by a budget, and the evaluation plans of donor countries do not usually provide a full account of initiatives and spending to enable meaningful monitoring. This priority area evaluates whether countries have adopted an NAP that includes a budget and addresses both domestic and global threats to peace and security.

WHAT THE \$2 TRILLION OF GLOBAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES DOES NOT BUY⁵⁴

- A reinvestment of just 5 percent of global military spending would exceed the initial climate adaptation costs in developing countries (SDG 13).
- The cost of achieving quality universal primary and early secondary education for all would barely exceed 3 percent of global annual military spending (SDG 4).
- Eliminating extreme poverty and hunger would amount to only about 13 percent of annual military spending (SDGs 1 and 2).

Findings, limitations, and future directions for Priority Area I

Peace & Militarization

Scores & Rankings




Figure 1. Priority Area I: Peace and Militarization

Ireland, which leads in this priority area, ranks 26th for the volume of its arms exports and 36th for its military expenditure. It is one of the eight countries in the dataset to have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons but has not ratified the Firearms Protocol. Notably, it has the highest ratio of health and education spending to military expenditure, 10 points higher than Switzerland, which ranks second for that indicator. **Overall, scores for this priority area range between 0 (Israel) and 1 (Ireland), with a median of 0.72 (shared by Germany, Canada, Romania, Portugal, Poland and Latvia), which is the same for the 10 FFP countries in the dataset.**

Israel, which ranks last for all indicators, has the highest per capita volume of arms exports and military expenditure and the lowest ratio of health and education to military spending. Israel has not adopted a National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 and has signed the Arms Trade Treaty but has not signed or ratified any of the other normative frameworks. The United States, ranked second from last, has the third largest per capita volume of arms exports (behind France), second largest per capita volume of military expenditure, has signed (but not ratified) the Arms Trade Treaty, and has adopted an NAP on Resolution 1325 in the form of a WPS national strategy, which could be strengthened with a detailed budget and an analysis of domestic threats to women's peace and security. The 10 countries with the highest per capita arms transfers and military expenditure are all in the Global North.

Thirty-three of the 48 countries in the dataset (69 percent) have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, Landmine Convention, and Firearms Protocol. However, only 6 of these 33 have ratified all four normative frameworks. South Africa is the only country to have signed all four normative frameworks and to also have an NAP that discusses both domestic and external security issues and is fully costed.

With regard to the 10 countries implementing or developing an FFP in this dataset, Mexico and Chile are ranked in the top 10 in this priority area. Sweden and Luxembourg are ranked 11 and 18, respectively. Germany and Canada rank 21 and 22, followed by Spain (33), the Netherlands (34), and Colombia (39). France has the lowest ranking in the group (42).

One of the key data limitations in this area is the availability and accuracy of data on arms procurement and military expenditure. Research has shown that the number of states that voluntarily report accurate information to relevant multilateral transparency instruments continues to decline.⁴⁰ In this dataset, 10 of the 48 countries have reported figures for less than half of the years under review for the arms transfers indicator (2014-2021), but all have reported (or estimated) figures for the period under review for the military expenditure indicator. Data for these two indicators have been retrieved from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), widely considered as the most comprehensive and reliable source of information on arms transfers and military expenditures.

Additionally, while the normative frameworks evaluated in this priority area are comprehensive in principle and increasingly gender-sensitive, transparency and enforcement challenges are weakening their actual implementation and thus limiting their potential to protect women and girls and advance disarmament and non-proliferation. Norms and obligations on paper do not necessarily lead to meaningful change on the ground. While it is not possible to measure the actual impact of these frameworks on global arms flows and the rights of women and girls, their signature or ratification is included in the Index as a signal of commitment and openness to multilateral cooperation to address disarmament and non-proliferation.

This priority area also highlights one of the key critiques of FFP, namely the lack of coherence

between policies and rhetoric at the domestic and the international level often displayed by the countries implementing or developing an FFP. Five of the ten top-ranking countries in this priority area are in Latin America. Although these countries perform well in terms of peace and demilitarization at the global level, Latin America has a long history of military interventions in politics, commonly in the form of military juntas in the past, or increasingly militarized democracies today.⁴¹ The case of Mexico, where the ongoing militarization of public security since 2006 has led to grave human rights violations that often go unpunished, is particularly relevant here.^{42,43} It has been estimated that confrontations between armed forces and alleged criminal groups have contributed to a shocking rise of femicides in Mexico, with 10 women murdered per day in 2019, and the majority happening increasingly in public spaces and with the use of a firearm.⁴⁴

Many have highlighted this disparity between promoting an FFP abroad while enabling militarization and GBV at home as a fundamental contradiction in Mexico's FFP, and this apparent contradiction will likely be an area of concern as more countries from the region develop their FFP plans. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged the issue and pledged to eliminate GBV in its own ranks as part of its FFP, a welcome commitment which should be strengthened with transparency and accountability on relevant initiatives and outcomes. The Index has not addressed the gendered impact of an increasingly militarized law enforcement on domestic security due to the lack of comparable data, but this remains a key area of focus for future research in this area.

Recommendations

In the current context of multiple conflicts and rising militarization, states implementing or developing an FFP can make significant investments in peace and human security in a number of ways:

- **Rethink military expenditures and consider reallocating funds to social services,**

including health and education, and services that respond to the specific needs of women and girls, for example those aimed at preventing and responding to GBV. Relatedly, collaborate with multilateral entities to improve transparency in the reporting of military expenditure and arms transfers.

- **Ratify normative disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks and strengthen their implementation and reporting.** More can be done to improve the implementation and monitoring of the Arms Trade Treaty and its requirement for ex ante assessments of the risk of GBV.
- **Strengthen NAPs for Resolution 1325 by including dedicated budgets and consistently monitoring their application.** Donor countries could strengthen their NAPs by ensuring that they address security challenges both at home and abroad and by consistently reporting on outcomes and financing.

PRIORITY AREA II

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Official development assistance remains one of the main sources of development financing and constitutes a key component of feminist foreign policies from donor countries.⁵⁵ According to OECD data, funding for gender equality and women's empowerment has continued to grow and remained steady through the first year of the pandemic.⁵⁶ **However, more funding is being committed to projects that integrate gender equality as one of multiple objectives (marked as "significant" according to the OECD gender marker methodology) rather than those exclusively targeting gender equality (marked as "principal").**⁵⁷ Furthermore, only a fraction of this funding reaches women's rights organizations and feminist movements.⁵⁸

More, and better, funding for gender equality as part of well-funded ODA portfolios can contribute to better outcomes toward gender equality.^{59,60} However, in stark contrast to the sustained increase of military expenditures and an almost 20 percent growth in arms imports to Europe described in Priority Area I above,

foreign aid budgets are shrinking, and targets for ODA as a share of GNI are being reduced or capped.⁶¹ As in-country spending on refugees and asylum seekers increases, some donor governments are deferring, suspending, reducing, or reprioritizing planned disbursements.⁶² More broadly, allocation decisions are often made on the basis of the security and business priorities of donors, with trade investments, for example, undermining development aid policies.^{63,64} The impact of these changes on aid for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity remains to be seen.

Indicators

This priority area evaluates only the 29 countries in the dataset that are members of the DAC.⁶⁵ It evaluates: 1) foreign aid as a share of GNI, 2) ODA that incorporates gender equality as a significant and principal objective, and 3) the share of ODA directed to women's rights and feminist organizations as captured by Sector Code 15170 (using data from the OECD Creditor Reporting



System—CRS).⁶⁶ For a full list of indicators, sources and coding, please see Annex I.

ODA as a share of GNI

In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution urging donor countries to provide at least 0.7 percent of their GNI as official development assistance.⁶⁷ Perhaps the best-known target, it has been repeatedly re-endorsed at the highest level at international aid and development conferences.⁶⁸ **Historically, however, only a handful of countries have consistently met or exceeded the target.**⁶⁹

ODA increased by 0.6 percent from 2020 to 2021, but the total amount was equivalent to just 0.33 percent of donors' combined GNI.⁷⁰ Sweden and Norway announced planned reductions to the target in 2022, and the United Kingdom has capped foreign aid at 0.5 percent of its GNI.^{71,72,73} Bucking the trend, Spain has announced both a small increase of aid as a share of its GNI for 2023, equivalent to \$890 million, and a commitment to achieving the 0.7 percent target by 2030.⁷⁴ France has also enshrined a commitment to reach the target by 2025 in recent legislation on foreign aid and development.⁷⁵

Some members of the development aid community have argued that the target no longer reflects current economic conditions and growth models, and that it is an inadequate metric for the delivery of better development outcomes.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, the target remains a useful advocacy tool. It signals commitment to development assistance and can be readily compared to other types of spending, such as military expenditure, to highlight government priorities. And while a higher share of a country's GNI does not automatically contribute to better development and gender equality outcomes, increasing the volume of development assistance while also integrating or prioritizing gender equality outcomes can accelerate progress toward more and better funding for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.

ODA for gender equality and the empowerment of women

The OECD gender marker is a statistical tool that records aid activities to advance gender equality, evaluating donor intentions at the project design stage. Projects marked as significant (i.e., including gender equality as one of many objectives, score of 1) and principal (i.e., exclusively targeting gender equality as the project outcome, score of 2) are counted as gender-equality focused aid.⁷⁷

According to the latest data provided by the OECD for 2019-2020, financial commitments that support programs for the advancement of gender equality and women's empowerment have reached a historic high of 45 percent of DAC members' bilateral allocable ODA.⁷⁸ To provide a longer-term view of gender-equality focused aid, this indicator measures gender-equality focused aid (both significant and principal), expressed as the average for 2014-2020 and normalized per capita, using data from the OECD CRS.

Aid for women's rights organizations

In addition to the policy marker discussed above, donors are required to assign a purpose code to their projects to indicate the main sector they are designed to support.⁷⁹ Analyses of data from these sector codes have shown that **women's rights organizations, in particular, are chronically under-resourced and excluded from decision-making processes**, and the situation is even more precarious for those working at intersecting forms of marginalization.⁸⁰ Other research has shown that 99 percent of development aid and foundation grants still do not directly reach women's rights organizations: Despite new commitments, women's rights organizations receive only 0.13 percent of total ODA and 0.4 percent of gender-sensitive aid.⁸¹ Bilateral allocable aid for women's rights organizations in conflict-affected countries, in particular, has been stagnating well below 1 percent since at least 2010 and actually decreased in 2020.⁸²

Findings, limitations, and future directions for Priority Area II Official Development Assistance

Scores & Rankings




Figure 2. Priority Area II: Official Development Assistance

This indicator measures bilateral allocable commitments captured by Purpose Code 15170: Aid for Women's Rights Organizations and Movements, and Government Institutions, expressed as the average for the period between 2014 and 2020 and normalized per capita.

In 2021, only five countries met or exceeded the 0.7 percent of GNI target: Luxembourg (1 percent), Norway (0.9 percent), Sweden (0.9 percent), Denmark (0.7 percent), and Germany (0.7 percent). Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands rank in the top five for both the highest volume of gender-equality focused ODA and funding commitments for women's rights organizations. Germany, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France are the five top donors of gender-equality focused aid by volume, but their scores drop when their funding is normalized per capita. **Scores for this priority area range from 0 (shared among the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece and Poland) to 1 (Norway), with a median of 0.19. FFP countries in the dataset have a median score of 0.39, outperforming the larger group.**

With five FFP countries in the top 10, and France and Spain (ranked 14 and 19, respectively) announcing initiatives (e.g., efforts to reach the 0.7 percent target and new mechanisms to fund women's rights organizations) that could improve their ranking in the future, this priority area indicates that FFP may be associated with increased attention to gender-sensitive development aid. Of course, increases to self-reported commitments do not necessarily lead to a consistent implementation of gender equality policies and initiatives.⁸³ The Index does not capture this discrepancy between intentions and outcomes. However, as the current funding landscape shifts and aid budgets are shrinking or reallocated, monitoring the volume and quality of funding for gender equality can be an important tool to continue pushing for more ambitious commitments and a clearer articulation of intended outcomes, particularly from FFP countries.

This priority area has also not been able to capture efforts to establish innovative financing

mechanisms to increase direct funding for women's rights organizations and feminist movements. Dedicated investment funds, such as Canada's Equality Fund, France's Support Fund for Feminist Organizations, and the Netherlands' Leading from the South have emerged as promising vehicles both for their increased financing and for the introduction of trust-based collaboration and leadership models in the management and delivery of their funds. The Netherlands ranks second in this dataset with regard to the share of funding dedicated to women's rights organizations and feminist movements, a possible indication of a successful funding model. Future versions of the Index could evaluate such efforts, if more countries develop similar mechanisms or decide to contribute funding to existing ones.

Recommendations

This priority area indicates that progress can be achieved, with donors becoming increasingly aware of their potential role in increasing gender-equality focused aid, particularly in the context of trust-based collaboration models between feminist movements and donor governments. At the same time, these efforts are fully dependent on political will and susceptible to budgetary pressures. Within this context, FFP countries can:

- **Develop plans to protect and address ODA holistically, increasing both total ODA as a share of GNI and gender-equality focused aid.**
- Ensure that **100 percent of bilateral allocable commitments incorporate gender equality as a significant goal, and at least 20 percent is dedicated to programs with gender equality as a principal target**, in line with feminist advocacy.
- **Improve and refine collaborative funding models** to direct more funds to women's rights organizations and feminist movements.

PRIORITY AREA III

MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT

As recognized in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, migration is “of major relevance” to the development of countries of origin, transit, and destination, necessitating a comprehensive and balanced approach to its global governance.^{84,85,86}

As of June 2021, an estimated 70 million women were among international migrant workers, increasingly concentrated in the care economy, including in domestic work.⁸⁷ Their contributions, in the form of knowledge transfers and financial remittances—which represent more than 10 percent of GDP in more than 30 countries—have been linked to poverty reduction, an increase in entrepreneurship, and economic and social development in countries of origin and destination.^{88,89} However, due to gendered labor markets, limited access to information and support networks in destination countries, and unequal power relationships with employers, women migrant workers are often limited to low-paid, low-skilled, and informal occupations and face abuse, threats of deportation, and other legal or social barriers without recourse.⁹⁰

Indicators

This priority area evaluates commitments to migrant integration and ensuring the well-being of women migrant workers, including those providing care services in the home. Indicators for this priority area include the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), and ratification of ILO Convention 97 on migration for employment, and Convention 189 on domestic workers.

The Migrant Integration Policy Index

Migration can create opportunities for women migrant workers, but weak regulatory and governance frameworks often lead to precarity and vulnerability, particularly as these frameworks intersect with race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and migration and employment status. **States often adopt restrictive, discriminatory policies that do not account for the gendered implications of migration, and tend to trade off rights protections for labor market access.**⁹¹ Migrant flows are increasingly regulated through bilateral



Photo credit: Jonathan Torgovnik, South Africa, Images of Empowerment

labor agreements that tend to favor temporary migration with specific requirements as to country of origin, gender, and skills; that tie the status of migrants to a single employer; and that often fail to provide protections or access to health and social services, thus increasing the risk of abuse or exploitation.⁹²

The MIPEX evaluates migrant integration policies in 56 countries across eight policy areas (labor market mobility; education; political participation; access to nationality; family reunification; health; permanent residence; and anti-discrimination). Scores for the MIPEX range from 0 (critically unfavorable, which corresponds to immigration without integration) to 100 (highly favorable, which corresponds to comprehensive integration that fully guarantees equal rights, opportunities, and security for immigrants and citizens).⁹³

ILO Convention 97 – Migration for Employment and 189 – Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers

ILO Convention 97 on migration for employment is a foundational document that establishes the principle of equality of treatment and opportunity between regular status migrants and nationals in employment and occupation. It provides a framework for the basic components of a comprehensive labor migration policy, including minimum standards of protection for men and women migrant workers, irrespective of migration status; measures to facilitate migration for employment and prevent abuse; and parameters for recruitment, employment, and family reunification.⁹⁴

This priority area also evaluates commitments to decent work for domestic workers, because domestic work is an important source of employment for women migrant workers.

According to the latest ILO global estimates, one-sixth of domestic workers in the world are international migrants, and women comprise 73.4 percent of all migrant domestic workers.^{95,96} Migrant domestic workers support household members to stay in the workforce in countries of destination and contribute billions of dollars in remittances to their countries of origin,

but discrimination and gaps in legal protection increase the likelihood of abuse and exploitation, with migrant women domestic workers particularly at risk.⁹⁷

ILO Convention 189 established the first global human-rights based framework for domestic workers, ensuring that they are entitled to the same basic rights as other workers and protected against exploitation and abuse, including by private recruitment and employment agencies. The adoption of the convention spurred action in many countries around the world to strengthen protections for domestic workers and reform existing laws in line with these new standards.⁹⁸

Findings, limitations, and future directions for Priority Area III

Migration for Employment

Scores & Rankings




Figure 3. Priority Area III: Migration for Employment

Portugal (1), the leader in this priority area, has the third highest score on the MIPEX and has ratified both ILO conventions. Belgium and Norway (0.93) rank second, followed by Brazil (0.9), Germany and Italy (0.86), and Sweden and Finland (0.6). Belgium, Norway, Brazil, Germany, and Italy have ratified both ILO conventions, but Sweden and Finland have ratified only C189 on domestic workers. **Scores in this priority area range between 0 and 1, with a median of 0.23. FFP countries in the dataset have a median score of 0.45.**

Looking at performance by indicator, Sweden, Finland, Portugal and Canada are the only countries in our dataset that score in the Favorable range (80-100) of the MIPEX, indicating that they adopt a comprehensive approach to integration that fully guarantees equal rights, opportunities, and security. Nine countries (New Zealand, the United States, Belgium, Norway, Australia, Brazil, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain) are in the Slightly Favorable range (60-79), also adopting a comprehensive approach, albeit one that is less advanced than the highest-ranking countries. Twenty-six countries (about half) are in the Halfway Favorable range (41-59), indicating that policies may provide immigrants with basic rights, equal opportunities, or security, but not all three at the same time. Countries scoring lower in this range may only provide immigrants with temporary integration or provide equality only on paper. Of the 48 countries in the FFP Index dataset, nine (19 percent) are in the Slightly Unfavorable range (21-40), indicating that migrants are not supported with basic rights or equal opportunities to participate in society. These are India (24), Indonesia (26), China (32), Lithuania and Latvia (37), Slovakia and Croatia (39), and Bulgaria and Poland (40).

At the multilateral level, uptake of ILO conventions on migration and domestic work has been minimal, with the majority of ratifications among migrant sending states.⁹⁹

In this dataset, only 12 countries (25 percent) have ratified ILO Convention 97 in the 74 years it has been in force. Seventeen countries (35

percent) have ratified ILO Convention 189, including all seven Latin American countries in the dataset. However, only six countries (13 percent) have ratified both conventions.

Recommendations

Current FFP approaches may include references to the security and protection needs of migrant women and recognize migration status as one of multiple intersecting identities, but in practice, most countries, including those with an FFP, often adopt restrictive immigration and family reunification policies.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, they undertake practices and activities that may contribute to displacement, such as providing countries in conflict with arms supplies, operating extractive industries in Indigenous lands, or promoting cooperation agreements around border controls that effectively keep migrants in or return them to situations of grave human rights violations.^{101,102}

To address the disconnect between the rhetoric of protecting women migrants and the policies that undermine their security and well-being, countries need to adopt rights-based, gender-sensitive frameworks that:

- elevate the participation and leadership of migrant women;
- abolish discriminatory bans and restrictions on migration;
- strengthen legal protections and access to remedies;
- adopt non-discriminatory family reunification schemes and residency regulations, and
- ensure full access to social inclusion and protection services.¹⁰³

PRIORITY AREA IV

LABOR PROTECTIONS

Freedom of association and collective bargaining are fundamental labor rights that form the basis of the social dialogue among employers, workers, and government representatives and promote increased productivity, stronger workers' rights, and improved working and organizational conditions.^{104,105} They are pivotal in fostering and maintaining sustainable development and critical to the empowerment of women.¹⁰⁶ **Feminists have called on governments to promote decent work and labor protections for women both domestically and in global value chains, including for women migrant and informal workers, in line with ILO conventions on freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work, the three indicators for this priority area.**¹⁰⁷

Indicators

ILO Convention 87 – Freedom of Association and ILO Convention 98 – Collective Bargaining

These two fundamental conventions are particularly relevant to gender equality. Globally, more than 80 million women have joined unions, organizing to dismantle structural barriers and to promote women to leadership positions, reduce wage gaps, fight discrimination in employment, improve work-life balance, and eliminate gender-based violence.¹⁰⁸ They also bring gender-sensitive perspectives into established issues, such as by negotiating occupational safety and health policies that take menstruation and menopause into account.¹⁰⁹ They have reframed care as an investment in sustainable development and have led the development of new laws on gender pay gaps, as well as the adoption of ILO conventions on domestic work and workplace violence.

Although the number of unionized women has increased since 2010, men continue to outnumber women both in membership and in leadership positions.¹¹⁰ Women's membership rate in the International Trade Union Confederation averages 42 percent, with



higher unionization rates in the public sector. The average representation of women in the highest decision-making bodies, however, is only 28 percent.¹¹¹

Of course, higher membership and leadership rates do not always lead to transformative change for gender equality. However, **ILO research has shown that trade union density is associated with lower gender pay gaps in high-income countries and an increase in female-centric provisions in collective bargaining agreements** (e.g. more female managers, longer maternity leaves, and longer job protection), leading to improved retention rates for women, fewer voluntary separations, and a higher rate of women among job applicants, without impacting employment, workers' wages or company profits.^{112,113}

ILO 190 – Convention on the Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of Work

Rooted in unequal power dynamics, stereotypes, and patriarchal values, **GBV remains one of the most tolerated violations of workers' human rights in global value chains**, often enabled by precarious working conditions, limited labor mobility, and corporate indifference.^{114,115,116} An ILO-Gallup report shows that unfair treatment, which includes abuse, harassment, and discrimination, is among the top three challenges facing working women, especially between the ages of 15 and 29.¹¹⁷ Yet, according to the World Bank's Women Business and the Law report, 31 percent of examined economies do not have laws protecting women from sexual harassment at work.¹¹⁸

ILO Convention 190 and its accompanying Recommendation 206 were adopted in 2019, after 10 years of trade union mobilization to address harassment and recognize domestic violence as a workplace issue. **This is a historic, progressive international legal instrument intended to hold governments, employers, and trade unions accountable for the elimination of workplace violence and harassment.**¹¹⁹ The convention applies

to every sector in the formal and informal economy, covers all workers irrespective of contractual status, and requires employers to address the impact of domestic violence at work. It is groundbreaking for its adoption of an intersectional approach, recognizing that the most robust protections should extend to those experiencing violence and harassment exacerbated by other forms of inequality and discrimination, the expansion of the world of work beyond the immediate physical workplace, and the requirement that employers address harassment involving third parties.¹²⁰

Findings, limitations, and future directions for Priority Area IV Labor Protections

As with all normative frameworks analyzed in this Index, countries are assigned a score of 0 if they have not signed a convention, 0.5 if they have signed but not fully ratified the convention in question, and 1 for full ratification. **In this dataset, only Argentina and Greece have ratified all three conventions for a score of 3.** Six more countries (Italy, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom) have ratified C87 and C98 and have also signed C190, for a total score of 2.5. Thirty-five countries have ratified C87 and C98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining for a total score of 2. Brazil and New Zealand have ratified C98 on collective bargaining for a total score of 1, and China, India, and the United States have not ratified any of these Conventions, for a total score of 0.

The sluggish uptake of ILO Convention 190 has been attributed in part to the COVID-19 pandemic that delayed ratification processes around the world. But it is precisely the horrific surge in domestic and gender-based violence, cyberbullying, and harassment—including of frontline workers—that the pandemic exposed and exacerbated that makes it imperative to accelerate efforts to achieve universal ratification.

Recommendations

Because two of the three labor conventions evaluated in this priority area enjoy near universal ratification, states implementing or interested in a FFP can focus on ensuring that their domestic legislation is in line with the provisions of these conventions, as well as on monitoring their implementation. **More efforts are needed to accelerate ratification of Convention 190 on the elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work, and to collect relevant data and monitor its implementation.**

PRIORITY AREA V

ECONOMIC JUSTICE

This section discusses trade liberalization, foreign investment, taxation, and human rights in the conduct of business in the context of an FFP. These key components of the global economy can improve women's economic participation and empowerment. In their current form and structure, however, they often contribute to violations of women's rights, entrench gendered occupational and wage gaps, facilitate tax evasion and profit shifting, and reduce the ability of governments—particularly in developing countries—to generate revenue.^{121,122,123} As a result, fiscal policies increasingly rely on regressive resource mobilization and austerity measures that typically target the provision of social services, education, and health, disproportionately affecting women—often the primary users of these services—whose incomes tend to be lower and spent on basic goods and services.¹²⁴

Feminist advocacy has led to a recognition of the different needs, roles, and potential of women and girls in the current economic

system, but initiatives to develop more equitable and gender-sensitive policies have remained voluntary and limited in application or have not been adequately inclusive in their development.^{125,126} Therefore, where applicable, sections discussing indicators below identify examples of more progressive or equitable policies that are currently being developed or negotiated, which countries implementing or developing an FFP can consider, to strengthen their own frameworks.

Indicators

Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment

Research has shown that trade expansion can increase women's labor force participation and improve women's economic empowerment in countries specializing in production for export.¹²⁷ However, when they fail to take into account the interaction between gender (as well as race, class, and other intersecting identity markers) with paid employment, consumption, public services,



Photo credit: Paula Bronstein, Thailand, Images of Empowerment

and care, they can also have adverse outcomes, including wage and occupational discrimination, precarity, a decline in time spent on care work and leisure, and limited access to public and social services.^{128,129,130,131}

In December 2017, 118 World Trade Organization members and observers endorsed the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment, agreeing to collaborate on making trade and development policies more gender-responsive; sharing best practices on gender-based analysis of trade policies and monitoring their effects; and removing barriers to women's participation in global trade, among other goals.¹³²

Unfortunately, the Declaration was designed and executed without input from feminist civil society.¹³³ However, the high number of endorsements has signaled an overwhelming interest in gender, trade, and women's economic empowerment. Although this interest is considerably narrower than the feminist vision for a just global trade system, it nonetheless creates opportunities for further engagement and transformative change.¹³⁴ Following the Declaration, for example, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in 2018 to ensure that all new EU trade agreements consider gender equality and labor standards and collect gender-disaggregated data.¹³⁵

Gender-sensitive trade agreements could be a better metric for this indicator, but the small number of existing agreements does not allow for meaningful comparison. Pioneered by Chile to ensure that the benefits of trade and economic growth are shared fairly, the so-called "new generation" agreements signed between Canada and Chile, Argentina and Chile, and Canada and Israel include dedicated gender chapters and commitments for the implementation of domestic legislation and policies on gender equality. However, they are not legally enforceable and labor provisions typically supersede gender commitments when they conflict.^{136,137,138} Strengthening these provisions and expanding the use of these agreements

could move the needle toward more progressive gender-sensitive trade policies.

Taking these various factors into consideration, this priority area is focusing on endorsement of the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment as a measure of support for improving the role of women in global trade.

Illicit Financial Flows Indicators: The Financial Secrecy Index and ratification of the OECD Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (MLI-BEPS)

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are "financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer or use, that reflect an exchange of value and that cross country borders," made possible partly through the absence of rules and regulations to curb or eliminate them and the tax abuse practices that facilitate them.^{139,140} IFFs accumulate in tax havens enabled by financial secrecy jurisdictions and drain resources from sustainable development and other domestic and international goals, obligations, and commitments. It has been estimated that global tax abuse costs countries a total of \$483 billion in lost taxes per year. The 2015 report of the High Level Panel on IFFs from Africa reported that the continent loses more than \$50 billion of domestic revenue per year, largely through corporate tax evasion, and Arab economies lose at least \$60.3 billion to \$77.5 billion per year.^{141,142} **These losses can translate into significant fiscal gaps that exacerbate debt and constrain the provision of public services, with the largest deficits noted in terms of resources available for women's rights and gender equality.**^{143,144,145}

The Committee for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women has expressed concern over the potential impact of financial secrecy policies and corporate taxation rules on women's rights and substantive equality.¹⁴⁶

The Financial Secrecy Index—one of the two indicators for evaluating IFFs—is a ranking

of jurisdictions most complicit in helping individuals hide their finances from the rule of law. It investigates how much financial secrecy the jurisdiction's laws allow and combines that information with how much the jurisdiction provides financial secrecy services to residents of other countries, thus capturing both how secretive a country's laws are, and how often the country's services are used. It is used in other composite indices for development and anti-laundering and has been used for risk analysis by private companies and central banks.¹⁴⁷

At the multilateral level, efforts to reform corporate tax rules and set global tax standards began in 2013 at the OECD. In 2016, over 100 jurisdictions concluded negotiations on MLI-BEPS. This convention, which entered into force in 2018 and to date has been accepted or ratified by 79 jurisdictions, outlines a series of measures to update international tax rules.¹⁴⁸ This priority area evaluates ratification of the MLI-BEPS as a signal of commitment to curbing illicit financial flows and tax avoidance by multinational enterprises.

Over the years, however, states, civil society organizations, trade unions, and expert groups have advocated for shifting decision-making powers to the United Nations to enable the meaningful participation of lower-income countries.¹⁴⁹ In October 2022, a draft resolution on the establishment of a UN convention on global taxation was submitted to the UN General Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee and was expected to be voted on in early December 2022.¹⁵⁰ Among other measures such as a minimum corporate tax rate, the draft specifically addresses the impact of tax policies on gender equality and women's rights, as well as the rights of persons with disabilities, environmental protection, and other social objectives.¹⁵¹ Future versions of the FFP Index could therefore evaluate support for this more progressive and equitable instrument as a commitment to curbing global tax avoidance and illicit financial flows.

Investor-State Dispute Settlements

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which often accompany trade agreements, afford specific protections and benefits to foreign investors, including recourse to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), enabling foreign investors to bring states to commercial arbitration (instead of domestic courts) if they perceive that policy measures adopted by the state jeopardize their expected profits.^{152,153} **With most new ISDS cases deriving from investment treaties signed at least 15 to 20 years ago, global issues such as climate change, labor and human rights, equality, and non-discrimination are arbitrated on the basis of outdated standards, without accountability to the public, and with potential costs of millions to billions of dollars in either fees or damages paid.**^{154,155} These sums can deplete public finances and foreign exchange reserves and undermine the provision of social services.^{156,157,158} In 2019, for instance, Pakistan was ordered to pay \$6 billion in compensation to a single foreign investor, a sum equal to the total amount the country had received in an International Monetary Fund bailout that same year.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, the use of investor-state arbitration to challenge policies and action on climate change, access to land and resources, affirmative action, access to generic and essential medicines, and labor and workers' rights has had a chilling effect on the pursuit of legitimate and progressive policy objectives.^{160,161,162,163,164}

United Nations human rights experts have also outlined the gendered implications of ISDS, beyond the fiscal constraints on the provision of social services outlined above. Many disputes involve natural resources and access to land that women rely on for their livelihoods, as well as access to food and fuel. Investors often seek countries with weak labor protections that disproportionately affect women. Furthermore, clauses that require equal treatment for foreign and domestic businesses disadvantage local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly those owned by women, which in middle-income developing countries can constitute up to almost 40 percent of formal SMEs.¹⁶⁵

Data for this indicator were drawn from the Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, maintained by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The navigator lists cases by country, year, sector, damages awarded, and other relevant parameters. Evidence from the navigator has shown that 70 percent of cases in 2020 were brought to arbitration by countries in the Global North.¹⁶⁶

There have recently been some early-stage efforts to incorporate gender into BITs, which a future version of this Index could evaluate if more countries adopt them. For example, in 2019 the Netherlands introduced an updated model BIT—a draft investment agreement template to negotiate future investment treaties—that is pioneering in its commitment to promoting equal participation and opportunities for men and women in the economy, highlighting the importance of gender equality for inclusive economic growth and addressing gender in the sections discussing the treatment of investors.^{167,168} At the same time, there is an apparent discrepancy between this progressive language and actual practice: as will be shown in the findings section below, the Netherlands has the second highest number of ISDS cases amongst the FFP countries in this dataset. It remains to be seen how the new BIT will affect the settlement of investment disputes in the future.

National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights and Voting on UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/9 on the establishment of an open-ended intergovernmental working group to develop a legally binding instrument on business and human rights

Women and girls experience the adverse impacts of business activities differently due to pre-existing and intersecting forms of discrimination based on their age, ethnicity and race, class, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Women can be disproportionately exposed to precarity, poor working conditions, and gender-based violence.¹⁶⁹ Their work is often undervalued and underpaid, and they may be denied the right

to organize into trade unions. They are more vulnerable to business-driven pollution, land acquisition, and natural resource degradation, leading to forced displacement and loss of livelihood.¹⁷⁰ The extractive sector can be particularly devastating for women, exposing them to sexual and gender-based violence; and women from Indigenous and marginalized communities often face additional heightened risk of attacks, smear campaigns, threats, sexual assault, and even murder. Women may also face additional barriers, including in the form of discriminatory laws and norms, when seeking access to remedy, particularly when the justice system is corrupt.¹⁷¹

To date, the need to protect the rights of women and girls in the conduct of private enterprises has been articulated in voluntary multilateral standards, such as the UN Guiding Principles, OECD Guidelines, and the Women's Empowerment Principles. Their recommendations, however, are not legally enforceable and have thus had limited success in curbing human rights violations or restructuring some of the elements in the global economic system that enable abuse.^{172,173,174}

At the state level, NAPs on business and human rights outline policy priorities and actions to support the implementation of these voluntary standards. The FFP Index evaluates these NAPs as a minimum commitment to addressing business and women's rights, recognizing that they may vary in terms of focus, clearly articulated goals and actions, and their integration of gender considerations. For example, many of them address labor and employment, but the impact of trade, the use of land, and effective access to remedy for women and girls may have received less attention.^{175,176} For this indicator, countries were assigned a score of 0 if they have no NAP in place, 1 if there are non-state initiatives in place or references to responsible business conduct in broader human rights action plans, 2 if they are developing a NAP, and 3 if they have a NAP, with data drawn from the database maintained by the Danish Institute for Human Rights.¹⁷⁷ Some states, including France and Germany, have

developed national “Value Chain Laws” to address the need for more robust, binding legislation. The European Commission has also adopted a proposal for a legally binding directive.¹⁷⁸ Domestic regulation, however, does not extend to the extraterritorial activities of corporations and is thus inadequate to address the full range of violations. In this context, Ecuador and South Africa brought Resolution 26/9 (A/HRC/26/9) to the Human Rights Council in 2014, proposing the establishment of an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to develop an international, legally binding instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other businesses.¹⁷⁹ The Working Group has held eight sessions as of November 2022 and is currently negotiating the third draft of the proposed instrument.¹⁸⁰ In anticipation of the legally binding instrument currently being negotiated in the UN, the FFP Index measures support for the establishment of the open-ended working group based on the voting record for the resolution, country delegation statements, and analysis by civil society organizations. Support for the instrument is perceived as indicative of a commitment to addressing human rights violations and gender-responsive due diligence in global value chains.

Findings, limitations, and future directions for Priority Area V Economic Justice

Scores & Rankings




Figure 4. Priority Area V: Economic Justice

Indonesia (1), the leader in this priority area, has endorsed the Buenos Aires Declaration, ranks 26th on the Financial Secrecy Index, has ratified the OECD instrument to prevent tax erosion (MLI-BEPS), supports a legally binding instrument on business and human rights, is developing a National Action Plan on business and human rights, and has not brought any investor-state disputes to arbitration. It is followed by Chile (0.91), China (0.88), Colombia and Peru (0.82), and Argentina (0.77) in the top five spots. **Scores for this priority area range from 0 to 1, with a median of 0.68 (Portugal, South Africa and France), also the median for FFP countries in the dataset.**

Looking at performance across indicators, the five countries with the highest financial secrecy score in this dataset are the United States, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Japan and Germany. The five countries with the highest number of investment settlement dispute cases are the United States (204), the Netherlands (125), the United Kingdom (96), Germany (77), and Spain (66).

Forty countries in the dataset (83 percent) have ratified the OECD MLI-BEPS instrument on tax evasion, and six more have signed but not ratified it. Brazil and the United States have not signed this tax treaty. Similarly, 45 countries have endorsed the Buenos Aires Declaration on trade and women's economic empowerment, but India, South Africa and the United States have not. Fourteen countries (29 percent) do not have a NAP on business and human rights, four (8 percent) have adopted non-state initiatives or mention responsible business conduct in other human rights documents, six (13 percent) are developing a NAP, and 24 (50 percent) have a NAP in place. Thirty-seven (77 percent) countries in the dataset voted against the establishment of a working group or have not supported the development of a legally binding instrument on business and human rights. Seven (15 percent) abstained, and only China, India, Indonesia and South Africa voted for the establishment of the working group.

Five of the seven Latin American countries in the

dataset rank in the top 10 for this priority area. Latin America has long paid attention to women's economic and labor rights, control of resources and land rights, and public investment and fiscal and macroeconomic policies.¹⁸¹ As more countries in the region are currently developing an FFP, they have the potential to introduce a transformative perspective to economic justice and labor rights.

Recommendations

In this priority area, feminist advocacy to recognize the different needs of women and girls and their positioning in the global economic system is gradually leading to efforts for more progressive and gender-sensitive trade and investment policies. To accelerate progress and achieve meaningful change, regulatory frameworks and commitments must be strengthened and the impact of inequitable financial, trade, investment and labor relationships re-evaluated. As outlined in the indicators sections above, efforts can focus on:

- **Integrating binding gender provisions in trade agreements** that holistically address the impact of trade on women as workers, consumers, and providers of care.
- **Supporting inclusive processes to reform the global taxation system to curb illicit financial flows** and their adverse impact on women's economic empowerment and broader development goals.
- **Integrating gender provisions in model bilateral investment treaties**, including in the chapters that discuss treatment of investors and dispute settlements.
- **Adopting National Action Plans that holistically address the impact of business operations on the rights of women and girls** and are developed through broad consultative processes.
- At the multilateral level, **supporting the development of an international, legally binding instrument to safeguard human rights in the conduct of business.**

PRIORITY AREA VI

INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS TO GENDER EQUALITY

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action calls on member states to work toward achieving balanced political participation and power-sharing between women and men in decision-making. **Despite evidence on the positive effect of increased women's participation in politics and governance, however, few countries have achieved parity or set ambitious goals for doing so.**¹⁸² This priority area measures the average share of women in ministerial-level positions and in national parliaments between 2014 and 2020 and also evaluates the full ratification of CEDAW as a commitment to the advancement of gender equality.

Indicators

Ratification of CEDAW without reservations

CEDAW is the foundational document in the international gender equality agenda. Often called a “women’s bill of rights,” it is a comprehensive treaty that guarantees women’s human rights and the prevention of discrimination against women by providing a framework of policies that governments

can implement to advance gender equality.¹⁸³ CEDAW focuses on three areas: the legal status of women; reproductive rights and choice; and the effect of culture and tradition on women’s fundamental rights.¹⁸⁴ It is one of the most broadly endorsed human rights frameworks, with near universal ratification (98 percent).

The FFP Index evaluates ratification of CEDAW as a fundamental commitment to the advancement of gender equality. **The convention and its recommendations provide a blueprint for FFP to address gender inequality as one of many inequalities that reinforce each other.** It can serve as an overarching framework to complement other instruments, such as treaties and conventions, that address gender partially or not at all, to ensure that all policies and initiatives are gender-sensitive.

Representation indicators: Share of women in ministerial level positions and in national parliaments

Equal representation in elected office and



appointed positions of leadership is both a fundamental right and a prerequisite for good governance. Research shows that women elected representatives diversify legislative agendas with positive outcomes for women and girls; push for change in social protection, education, health, and the provision of public goods; are more likely to reach consensus and work across political lines; and are associated with lower levels of corruption.^{185,186,187,188} Women's presence also erodes negative perceptions about women as political leaders; for example, states with women chief executives and parliamentarians are more likely to also have women defense ministers.^{189,190}

Other exploratory evaluations of FFP have focused on the presence of women in the foreign policy apparatus as an indicator of a commitment to including women in positions of influence.¹⁹¹ The FFP Index, however, takes a broader approach and looks at the average share of both women in parliament and women ministers from 2014-2020. The Index explores representation at the ministerial level because a whole-of-government approach is needed for an FFP that successfully addresses all of the different priority areas in the Index. At the same time, elected officials are often FFP allies and can advocate for the adoption of an FFP, as has been the case in the European Union, Scotland, and the United States.^{192,193,194}

Findings, limitations, and future directions for Priority Area VI

Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality

Scores & Rankings




Figure 5. Priority Area VI: Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality

Sweden, the leader in this priority area, has ratified CEDAW and has had the highest average percentage of women in parliament (45.3) and in ministerial level positions (54.5) for the period between 2014 and 2020. **Scores for this area range between 0 and 1, with a median of 0.49 (Estonia). The 10 FFP countries in the dataset have a median score of 0.67.**

In this dataset, 30 countries (63 percent) have fully ratified CEDAW, and 17 countries (35 percent) have done so with reservations. The United States remains a notorious outlier, despite persistent calls from civil society, academia, and multilateral partners to ratify the Convention.¹⁹⁵ In terms of representation, Mexico, South Africa, Finland, and Spain follow Sweden in the top five rankings for women parliamentarians, and France, Finland, Spain and Canada rank in the top five for women ministers. Japan, Hungary and India had the lowest share of women parliamentarians, and less than 10 percent of ministers in China, Türkiye and Hungary were women. Shares of women parliamentarians ranging between 10-20 percent were the most frequent in the dataset (38 percent of countries). Twenty-nine percent of countries, however, had shares of women ministers that ranged only between 0 and 20 percent.

Of course, representation does not always equal power. Women ministers, for example, continue to receive portfolios with lower political priority. This could be an area of future research for the FFP Index, along with representation in foreign service. Additionally, the Index has not been able to capture women's representation in all their diversity. We do know, for example, that Indigenous women comprise 20 percent of the 923 members of parliament for which gender-disaggregated data are available.¹⁹⁶ Evidence from 19 countries in 2017 shows that only 2.3 percent of women with disabilities compared to 2.8 for men with disabilities held a position as a legislator, senior official or manager.¹⁹⁷ Finally, as of November 2013, there were 113 openly lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender legislators elected to serve in national office in 25 countries

around the world.¹⁹⁸ The lack of comparable data for the countries in our dataset across these identifiers, however, has not enabled meaningful comparison at this stage.

Recommendations

To strengthen commitments to gender equality, countries in the dataset can prioritize:

- **Ratifying CEDAW and/or withdrawing their reservations to it.**
- **Accelerating progress toward meaningful representation and inclusion**, including through the adoption of measures such as quotas, and dedicated financing and other resources, where applicable.¹⁹⁹
- **Improving representation at the ministerial level**, and ensuring that women are represented in ministerial portfolios with broader foreign policy implications (e.g. finance, trade, defense, etc.).

PRIORITY AREA VII

CLIMATE

This priority area evaluates commitments to addressing the climate emergency, both as a standalone threat to humanity and for its linkages to the other priority areas in this Index.²⁰⁰ Climate change is a driver of conflict and instability, but industrialized militaries significantly contribute to the climate emergency.^{201,202} Climate change could displace as many as one billion migrants by 2050, but the richest countries collectively spend more than twice as much on borders and immigration enforcement than on climate finance.^{203,204} Climate shocks exacerbate the debt burden and restrict the fiscal capacities of developing countries, while global trade contributes to the rise in global emissions, and investor-state disputes challenge legislation such as the regulation of coal mines, blocking progress toward a green transition.^{205,206,207}

Due to pre-existing discrimination and inequalities, the impacts of climate change are not gender-neutral.²⁰⁸ Climate change exposes women to food insecurity and increased risks to their physical, mental, and reproductive

health.^{209,210} Depleted resources and damaged infrastructure can affect women's employment opportunities and working conditions, pushing many to migrate and thus exposing them to risks associated with human mobility, such as sexual and gender-based violence, human trafficking, and early and forced marriage.²¹¹ Women who stay to defend their communities and challenge human rights abuses are often the target of threats, intimidation, harassment, violence, and even assassination.²¹²

Indicators

This priority area evaluates: 1) carbon dioxide (CO²) emissions as a share of GDP, 2) net-zero pledges, 3) NDCs and gender, 4) the share of women delegates in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) climate negotiations, and 5) contributions to the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

CO² emissions as a share of GDP

This priority area evaluates human-originated carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the



burning of fossil fuels, gas flaring, and the production of cement per unit of GDP. Higher emission intensity means that more pollution is being created per unit of GDP.

In the context of the FFP Index, this indicator is included to highlight that none of the pledges and initiatives outlined in this priority area or in other policy documents and pledges can be meaningful or truly feminist, as long as countries rely on domestic and consumption patterns that are incompatible with ecological sustainability.

Net-zero pledges

To avoid the worst impacts of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must reach net-zero early in the second half of the century. **Eighty-nine parties to the Paris Agreement have adopted net-zero emissions targets in their NDCs, representing 93 countries and 79 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.**

In line with the evaluation of emissions outlined above, this priority area examines whether the countries in the dataset have adopted a net-zero pledge as an indicator of a strong commitment to climate action both at the domestic and the multilateral level. To evaluate the strength of these pledges, higher scores are awarded based on whether these commitments have been articulated as a political pledge, in a policy document, or enshrined in legislation. While not specific to gender or the rights of women and girls, these pledges are evaluated for their potential to benefit all and alleviate the burden of climate change that is often disproportionately borne by women and girls.

Gender-sensitive NDCs

In 1992, parties to the UNFCCC committed to periodically submitting the policies and initiatives they would implement to contribute to the stabilization of greenhouse gases, in accordance with their differentiated responsibilities and development priorities.²¹³ The Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) has evaluated the extent to which these NDCs address women's human rights and the broader linkages between gender and climate change.²¹⁴ Using the Gender Climate Tracker data

and analysis by WEDO, the FFP Index evaluates the NDCs submitted by the countries in this dataset for references to women and/or gender, recognition of women as a vulnerable group or as agents of change, and the transformative potential of the policies and initiatives outlined therein.

WEDO cautions that the conclusions they have drawn in their analysis should be considered as relatively tentative, formed on the basis of the information governments have opted to share. WEDO analysis finds that submitted NDCs fall far short of the necessary commitments.²¹⁵ Sixty-four of the 190 NDCs in their analysis include references to gender or women, but these are typically in the context of development, rather than climate policy. Thirty-four NDCs refer to women as a vulnerable group, but only six recognize them as agents of change.

Women party delegates in UNFCCC meetings

Women are far from passive victims of climate change and environmental degradation. **An in-depth study has shown that a one unit increase in a country's score on the Women's Political Empowerment Index corresponds to an 11.5 percent decrease in the country's carbon emissions.**²¹⁶ Parliaments with a greater proportion of female members have a higher ratification rate of environmental treaties, and corporate boards with more women disclose more carbon emissions information.²¹⁷ Multiple frameworks, such as the Lima Work Program and the UNFCCC Gender Action Plan, seek to improve women's participation and their influence on climate decisions. However, in-person participation continues to lag, and the need to improve women's representation and leadership is ever more urgent.²¹⁸

The 2022 annual report of the Secretariat of the Conference of the Parties on gender composition notes that **since 2013, the representation of women in party delegations and among head and deputy heads of delegations has decreased.** Furthermore, as women's age increases, their representation sharply decreases.²¹⁹ Men spoke for longer than

female speakers, even in meetings where they were under-represented, and men were over-represented in specific thematic meetings, such as on gender and finance, including at the highest level of decision-making.²²⁰

supporting developing countries to raise and realize their NDCs.²²⁴ As of July 31, 2020, the Green Climate Fund has raised \$10.3 billion equivalent in pledges from 49 countries/regions/cities, including from nine developing countries.

Given the lack of comparable data on speech duration and thematic representation for the countries in the dataset, the FFP Index measures women's presence in the UNFCCC process, expressed as the average percentage of party delegates between 2014 and 2022. Again, the FFP Index relies on data that WEDO compiled for the Gender Climate Tracker to evaluate participation. WEDO analysis notes that, since 2008, UNFCCC decisions to strengthen women's participation, quotas, and gender plans at the national level, as well as civil society advocacy, had led to an increase in women's overall participation and at the highest levels of decision-making. However, data from recent years show that this progress is inconsistent and, in some areas, stalled.²²¹

Contributions to the Green Climate Fund per capita

Climate finance is a key area in which women's under-representation and a failure to integrate gender considerations shows up quite starkly. Many developed countries have indicated their support for gender-sensitive climate initiatives through international funding and development programs. However, an OECD analysis found that while more than half of climate finance from bilateral contributors and the G20 countries integrated gender equality as a significant objective, only 0.04 percent of climate finance targeted gender as a principal objective.²²²

This priority area evaluates per capita contributions to the Green Climate Fund as a commitment to climate finance. The Green Climate Fund was selected from the multiple existing financing mechanisms because it is the largest environmental fund and the first financing vehicle in its operations in its organizing charter obligating it to integrate gender from the outset of its operations.²²³ Furthermore, it was selected because it requires project-specific gender action plans for project approval and for its focus on

Findings, limitations, and future directions for Priority Area VII

Climate

Scores & Rankings




Figure 6. Priority Area VII: Climate

Sweden (1), the leader in this priority area, ranks 47th in CO² emissions per unit of GDP, second in per capita contributions to the Green Climate Fund, and 15th in the share of women in party delegations. It has enshrined its net-zero pledge into law and its NDCs are gender-sensitive. It is followed by Luxembourg (0.84), Finland (0.76), the United Kingdom (0.73) and Spain (0.66) in the top five positions. **Scores in this priority area range from 0 to 1, with a median score of 0.41 (Ireland). FFP countries in the dataset have a median score of 0.55.**

Looking at performance across indicators, South Africa, China, Canada, Australia and the Republic of Korea have the highest share of emissions per unit of GDP, unlike most highly industrialized countries whose emission intensity has plateaued at a certain level of economic growth.²²⁵ Switzerland, Sweden, Costa Rica, Ireland and Iceland have the lowest emission intensity in this dataset.

Eight of the countries under evaluation have not adopted a net-zero pledge, including Mexico and the Netherlands, two FFP countries. Forty-four percent of countries in the dataset have adopted such commitments as a political pledge, in a policy document, or as a combination of both. Almost 40 percent of the countries have enshrined their net-zero pledges into law. This group includes Canada, Australia, and the Republic of Korea, who are among the top five emitters per unit of GDP.

Eastern Europe (Latvia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Croatia) dominates the top five rankings for the average share of women in party delegations for 2014-2022. At the other end of the scale, India, Japan, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Brazil have had the lowest share of women delegates. Fifty-two percent of countries in the dataset were at or above parity.

Looking at NDCs, only eight countries in the dataset (Australia, China, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Türkiye, and the United States) have submitted NDCs that include

no reference to gender or women. The majority of countries (71 percent) have NDCs that are gender-sensitive or responsive. However, none of the countries have an NDC that has been evaluated as transformative, indicating that references to gender and women are not matched by actionable commitments. Similar to the findings of the WEDO analysis of NDCs, only four countries in the dataset (Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) reference women as a vulnerable group, and just two of the 48 (Chile and Costa Rica) recognize women as agents of change.

Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom are the largest per capita contributors to the Green Climate Fund. In this dataset, 11 countries (23 percent) have not yet made a contribution.

One of the key limitations of this indicator has been the inability to reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. First articulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration, this principle clarifies that states are at different stages of development and have contributed differently to global environmental degradation, and therefore each has a different set of responsibilities and capabilities to contribute to equitably address climate and environmental impacts.²²⁶ Future versions of the Index could be based on the so-called “fair share” of climate finance, apportioning responsibility for the goal of mobilizing \$100 billion per year by 2020, to which developed countries committed in 2009 to support climate action in developing countries. In 2020, only \$83.3 billion had been mobilized, and to date only Germany, Norway and Sweden have been paying their share, with some high-income countries providing less than 20 percent of their apportioned share.²²⁷ Additionally, contributions to the Green Climate Fund are not marked for their gender content, as the OECD gender marker does for development aid, so it is not immediately clear how the gender analysis required at the application stage matches commitments to gender equality.

Recommendations

The scale and urgency of the climate crisis may be daunting, but countries implementing or developing FFPs have an array of options at their disposal to accelerate gender-just solutions. Mexico, an FFP country, has taken a series of actions to signal their strong commitment in this regard. For one, **ambitious but realistic net-zero pledges should be codified into law.** The Mexican General Law on Climate Change guarantees the right to a healthy environment and includes specific indicators for climate change and gender equality.²²⁸ **NDCs should strengthen their gender analysis, recognize and amplify the role of women as agents of change, and identify concrete opportunities for transformative policies.** To do this, however, states need to ensure that gender perspectives are integrated at all levels of decision-making, taking **concrete steps to improve and adequately monitor the meaningful participation of women and girls in climate action.** Since the announcement of its FFP, the share of women in Mexico's delegations has increased from 58 percent in 2019 to 72 percent in 2021, while the delegation was led by a woman three times since 2016. Mexico is developing a strategy to increase women's participation and strengthen their leadership in the UNFCCC, with a focus on improving the participation of members from marginalized communities.²²⁹ **States also need to accelerate the disbursement of their financial commitments and to pay attention to the quality of their funding to avoid exacerbating debt burdens in developing countries.**

These are only first steps toward much deeper changes to lifestyles, economic models, conceptions of security, and domestic consumption patterns that are incompatible with ecological sustainability and the well-being of all. **Climate change and gender inequality are upheld and perpetuated by the same unequal systems of production and reproduction. Reforming those systems is the only way to tackle both issues simultaneously and effectively.**

Overall Findings for the Feminist Foreign Policy Index

Feminist Foreign Policy




Figure 7. The Feminist Foreign Policy Index

This Index lays out an expansive vision for FFP that addresses some of the structural drivers of gender inequality. It evaluates commitments to global peace and security; official development assistance for gender equality; migration for employment; labor protections; economic justice; political representation and institutional frameworks; and a gender-just climate response. It is premised on the idea that, together, the priority areas outlined here can lead to transformative change at the multilateral and domestic level with knock-on effects for the other priority areas in the Index.

Figure 7 shows the FFP Index results after all priority areas are put together. **Sweden (0.8) leads the group, followed by Norway (0.73), Mexico and Finland (0.67), Costa Rica and Peru (0.65), Germany (0.63), South Africa, Chile and Argentina (0.62), Luxembourg (0.61), Portugal (0.6), Colombia and Belgium (0.59) and Spain (0.58).** These are the 10 highest scores in the group. Six of the seven Latin American countries and seven of the ten countries that are implementing or developing an FFP in the dataset are in this group of highest-ranking countries. **The median score of FFP countries in this dataset is 0.6.**

The United States (0.12), India (0.24), China (0.28), Türkiye (0.31), and Israel and Korea (0.34) are the countries with the five lowest scores. Their rankings are shaped by their arms exports and/or large military budgets; the low rate of ratification for key multilateral frameworks on peace and security, migration, decent work, and the rights of women; their contribution to economic injustice due to financial secrecy or unequal trade and investment agreements; the under-representation of women in politics and in climate-related negotiations; their weak integration of gender considerations in climate policies; and/or their low contributions to climate financing. As the only DAC member among these five, the United States is the largest provider of foreign aid by volume, but the total is equal to just 0.2 percent of GNI, and the share of aid focused on gender equality or reaching women's rights organizations is small.

This report acknowledges some limitations inherent in the FFP Index methodology. Key among them is the fact that, while it is possible to evaluate the existence of policies or numerical targets for representation and financial contributions, these are often not sufficient to evaluate the actual impact of policies, contributions, or having more women in a room. In recognition of this and other limitations pertaining to the availability of indicators and data, particularly those that capture the full diversity of women and girls, the Index is intended as a guidance tool for policy makers, laying out an array of options and grouping together peers to facilitate comparison and knowledge sharing. The ultimate goal is for governments and civil society to collectively work together to create an even more ambitious vision for a feminist foreign policy that prioritizes:

- **A significant investment in peace and human security**, rethinking the use of financial resources to promote disarmament, demilitarization, and non-proliferation, and strengthening the ratification and implementation of foundational disarmament treaties and protocols.
- **An innovative, trust-based collaboration model between feminist movements and ODA donor governments** that protects ODA and maintains sufficient levels in line with the 0.7 percent as share of GNI goal; achieves the goal of 100 percent of ODA incorporating gender objectives and at least 20 percent targeting gender equality as a principal objective; and improves and refines collaborative funding models to direct more funds to women's rights organizations and feminist movements.
- **A rights-based approach to migration**, both tackling its underlying structural causes and identifying gender-sensitive policies and approaches to facilitate safe and orderly migration. These include strengthening the participation and leadership of migrant women, repealing discriminatory laws and restrictions on migration, strengthening legal protections and access to remedies, and adopting non-discriminatory family

reunification schemes and residency regulations.

- **The ratification of fundamental labor standards, with a special focus on ILO Convention 190 on violence and harassment in the world of work**, and, more broadly, an interrogation of current economic, trade, and labor practices that may be contributing to inequalities, including gender inequality, in global value chains.
- **A global economic system that promotes women's equal inclusion in the economy** through equitable and gender-sensitive trade and investment agreements, while also reducing illicit financial flows and upholding human rights.
- **Accelerated efforts to realize existing climate commitments** that recognize women's agency and leadership in climate change mitigation and sustainable resource management.
- **Ratification of CEDAW without reservations and increasing women's meaningful representation** at all levels of decision-making and leadership in all of the priority areas outlined in this Index.

We hope that this overview of feminist foreign policy and analysis of countries' performance via this newly developed FFP Index is a timely, helpful contribution that can encourage deeper reflection and bolder action in governments that already apply a feminist lens to their foreign policies, and present those considering declaring an FFP—particularly governments in the Global South—with an array of policy options to incorporate in their frameworks.

ANNEX 1

DATASET AND INDICATOR FRAMEWORK

Dataset

Inspired by the framework proposed by Christine Alwan and S. Laurel Weldon, the Index focuses on 48 OECD members, partners, and accession candidates.²³⁰

TABLE 1: COUNTRIES IN THE DATASET BY OECD STATUS²³¹

Members (38)	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States
Accession candidates (6)	Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru, Romania
Key Partners (4)	China, India, Indonesia, South Africa
Countries in the dataset with a Feminist Foreign Policy (10)	Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden.

TABLE 2: INDICATORS

Priority area and # of indicators ▲	Indicator ■	Description ●	Source ⬡
Peace and Militarization (5)	Arms Transfers	<p>Country-level Total Indicator Values for 2014-2021 in USD billion. Reported per capita.²³²</p> <p>Note: A '0' indicates that the value of deliveries is less than \$0.5 million.</p> <p>Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, and Ireland had values for fewer than half of the years under evaluation. Given the uncertainty inherent in arms trade figures and states' diminishing willingness to fully or accurately report their transactions, it was decided to calculate averages based on the figures reported.</p>	SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, available at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
	Military Expenditure	<p>Average military spending of countries for 2014-2021 per capita, in current USD.</p> <p>For information on definition, sources and methods, please see: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/sources-and-methods</p>	SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at https://milex.sipri.org/sipri
	Ratio of education and health expenditure to military expenditure	Average for 2016-2019. Sum of government expenditure on education and health divided by military expenditure.	UNDP Human Development Report. Dashboard 5: Socioeconomic Sustainability, available at https://hdr.undp.org/socioeconomic-sustainability

TABLE 2: INDICATORS

Priority area and # of indicators ▲	Indicator ■	Description ●	Source ◈
<p>Peace and Militarization (5)</p>	<p>Normative Frameworks on Disarmament</p>	<p>A. Ratification of the following normative frameworks: The Arms Trade Treaty The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) The Firearms Protocol The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.</p> <p>Coding: 0 = No signature or ratification, 0.5 = Signature, 1 = State parties (accession or ratification)</p> <p>B. National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325 Adoption of a fully costed NAP, which integrates both domestic and global challenges and approaches to Women Peace and Security. Coding: 0 = No NAP, 0.5 = Costed or incorporates domestic considerations, 1 = costed and incorporates domestic considerations. Author's analysis.</p>	<p>ATT: https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-status.html?templateId=209883 Ottawa Treaty: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-5&chapter=26&clang=en Firearms Protocol: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter=18&clang=en#3 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: https://www.icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_status</p> <p>List of current National Action Plans: https://wpsfocalpointsnetwork.org/resources/</p>
<p>Official Development Assistance (ODA) (3)</p>	<p>ODA as share of Gross National Income (GNI)</p>	<p>ODA grant equivalent, % of GNI, 2018-2021.</p>	<p>OECD Net ODA data, available at https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm</p>

TABLE 2: INDICATORS

Priority area and # of indicators ▲	Indicator ■	Description ●	Source ⬡
Official Development Assistance (ODA) (3)	Total aid with gender as a significant or principal goal	Funding for Sector Code 15170 “Women’s rights organizations and movements, and government institutions”	OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) - Aid Activities Targeting Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1
Migration for Employment (3)	2020 Migrant Integration Policy Index	<p>The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) measures policies to integrate migrants in countries across six continents and for eight policy areas. Latest available data are for 2019.</p> <p>Missing values:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colombia and Peru were given a score of 52, which is the average of Chile and Mexico. • Costa Rica has received an evaluation of Medium in this analysis, which would correspond to the Halfway Favorable (41-59) on the MIPEX. Thus, Costa Rica was given the median score of 50. 	The Migrant Integration Policy Index, available at https://www.mipex.eu/

TABLE 2: INDICATORS





Priority area and # of indicators 	Indicator 	Description 	Source 
Migration for Employment (3)	ILO Convention No. 97, Migration for Employment (Revised), 1949	Coding: 0 = not signed, 0.5 = signed but not in force, 1 = in force	NORMLEX, Information System on International Labor Standards https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312242
	ILO, Domestic Workers Convention No. 189, 2011		NORMLEX, Information System on International Labor Standards https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460:NO
Labor Protections (3)	ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87)		NORMLEX, Information System on International Labor Standards https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312232:NO
	ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)		NORMLEX, Information System on International Labor Standards https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312243:NO
	ILO, Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190)		NORMLEX, Information System on International Labor Standards https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:3999810:NO

TABLE 2: INDICATORS

Priority area and # of indicators ▲	Indicator ■	Description ●	Source ◈
Economic Justice (5)	Financial Secrecy Index, 2022	The Financial Secrecy Index is a ranking of jurisdictions most complicit in helping individuals to hide their finances from the rule of law.	https://fsi.taxjustice.net/
	Investment Dispute Settlements	Number of cases as home state of claimant.	UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement
	OECD Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting	A series of tax treaty measures to update international tax rules and lessen the opportunity for tax avoidance by multinational enterprises. This convention already covers 100 jurisdictions and entered into force on July 1, 2018. Signatories include jurisdictions from all continents and all levels of development, and other jurisdictions are also actively working toward signature. Status as of November 10, 2022.	https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf
	Endorsement of the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment	Coding: 0 = Not endorsed, 1 = Endorsed	World Trade Organization, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/womenandtrade_e/buenos_aires_declaration_e.htm

TABLE 2: INDICATORS

Priority area and # of indicators ▲	Indicator ■	Description ●	Source ⬡
Economic Justice (6)	International legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights	Outcome of recorded vote for Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/9 on support for establishment of open-ended intergovernmental working group. Coding: 0 = Against (or did not participate), 0.5 = Abstaining, 1 = In favor	United Nations Human Rights Council, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/082/52/PDF/G1408252.pdf?OpenElement
	National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights	To support implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Coding: 0 = No plan, 1 = Non-state initiatives or mentions to responsible business conduct in broader human rights action plans, 2 = developing a NAP, 3 = NAP in place	The Danish Institute for Human Rights, available at https://globalnaps.org/country/
Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality (3)	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	Ratification without reservations. Coding: 0 = Not ratified, 0.5 = Signature, or ratification with reservations, 1 = Ratification, Accession, Succession	United Nations Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=en#EndDec
	Proportion of women in ministerial level positions (%)	Average for 2014-2020. This dataset does not include data for 2017.	The World Bank, DataBank, Gender Statistics, available at https://databank.worldbank.org/reports .

TABLE 2: INDICATORS

Priority area and # of indicators ▲	Indicator ■	Description ●	Source ⬡
Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality (3)	Proportion of seats held in national parliaments by women (%).	Average for 2014-2020.	The World Bank Data, available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=AU-AR-AT-BE-BR-BG-CA-CL-CN-CO-CR-HR-CZ-DK-EE-FI-FR-DE-GR-HU-IS-IN-ID-IE-IL-IT-JP-KR-LV-LT-LU-MX-NL-NZ-NO-PE-PL-PT-RO-SK-SI-ZA-ES-SE-CH-TR-GB-US
Climate (5)	Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP	Tonnes, 2019. Total carbon dioxide emissions produced as a consequence of human activities (use of coal, oil and gas for combustion and industrial processes, gas flaring and cement manufacture), divided by midyear population. Values are consumption emissions, meaning that emissions are attributed to the country in which goods and services are consumed.	United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Dashboard 4: Environmental Sustainability, available at https://hdr.undp.org/environmental-sustainability
	Women's participation in party delegations.	Percentage of women party delegates by country. Average for 2014-2022 (the dataset does not include data for 2020). The percentage of women party delegates per meeting is calculated by dividing the total number of women delegates by the total number of delegates.	Women's Environment and Development Organization, Gender Climate Tracker, Women's Participation Statistics in Climate Diplomacy, available at https://www.genderclimatetracker.org/womens-participation-party-delegations

TABLE 2: INDICATORS

Priority area and # of indicators ▲	Indicator ■	Description ●	Source ⬠
Climate (5)	Contributions to the Green Climate Fund	As of July 31, 2021, announced per capita. USD equivalent based on the reference exchange rates established for the Pledging Conference in 2014 (Green Climate Fund/BM-2015/Inf.01/Rev.01). GDP in rounded USD eq. per capita.	Green Climate Fund, Resource Mobilisation, available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation/irm
	Normative Climate Indicators	<p>Sum of:</p> <p>A. Evaluation of the extent to which countries address women's human rights and the linkages between climate change and gender in their latest submitted National Determined Contributions (NDCs) using the tags developed for the Gender Climate Tracker. Coding: No reference to gender = 0, Sensitive or Responsive = 0.25, Sensitive or Responsive and also recognizing women as vulnerable group = 0.5, Gender-Transformative = 0.75, Recognizing women as agents of change = 1</p> <p>B. Net-zero targets that have been communicated in a party's NDC, long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategy, domestic law, policy, or high-level political pledge such as head of state commitment. Coding: 0 = None, 0.25 = In political pledge, 0.5 = In policy, 0.75 = Combination of in political pledge and in policy, 1 = In law</p>	<p>Women's Environment and Development Organization, Gender Climate Tracker, Country Profiles, available at https://www.genderclimatetracker.org/country-profiles</p> <p>For more information on the gender tags, please see: https://www.genderclimatetracker.org/gender-mandates/introduction/?s</p> <p>CLIMATEWATCH, Net-zero Tracker, available at https://www.climatewatchdata.org/net-zero-tracker</p>

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